

The Wrong Man in Uniform

The first thorough examination of the draft, its failings, its "politics" and its alternatives.

OUR MANPOWER RIVER AND THE DRAFT'S DAMS

1. The Obsolete Draft
2. Scholars, Fathers, Farmers, Reservists
3. Disqualifications: "One Half of the Nation"
4. The Leaky Dams
5. The Clogged Pipeline
6. Are You Lucky in Where You Live?

ONE FRYING PAN, SEVERAL FIRES

7. The Draft Lobby
8. The Draft as Society's Benefactor
9. The Poverty Myth
10. The Deficient Alternatives

NEW MEN FOR A NEW MILITARY

11. The Ethics of Abolition
12. A Voluntary Military
13. A Transitional Draft
14. The Best Defense—Beyond the Draft

THE WRONG MAN IN UNIFORM
CHAPMAN



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*Our Unfair and Obsolete Draft
—and How We Can Replace It*

BY BRUCE K. CHAPMAN

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—and How We Can Replace It*

Bruce K. Chapman

TRIDENT PRESS



NEW YORK 1967

To my parents

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Introduction

—REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS B. CURTIS
(R—MISSOURI)

The defense of a nation's values by military force presents difficult choices for any society. For the American people, born under the aegis of individual liberty and maximum freedom from arbitrary governmental interference in the lives of independent men, such choices are especially hazardous. For an inappropriate system of national defense may threaten those very ideals our society exists to preserve. A discussion of the draft and our policies of manpower procurement for the military, then, carries us into a consideration of the very basic values which our form of government was established to protect. It is important that the American public take up this discussion and give the question of the draft, and its effect on American society, the fullest attention.

Our modern technological society has produced a new concept of warfare. No longer do the principles of mass warfare, conducted by massive armies across wide expanses of ground with primitive weapons, hold true. The modern soldier is a specialist, a technician of war, a "knight on horseback" who rides to battle in tanks, helicopters and armored personnel carriers and is equipped with a bewildering array of sophisticated weapons and implements of war. War, which once was a sport of royalty, is now a

conflict between civilizations, and the entire economy and productive capacity of a nation are part of the field of conflict. Therefore, the issue of military manpower procurement raises questions of economics as well as justice; and as economic decisions affect nearly every other decision our society is called upon to make, this issue demands the serious attention of our leaders in government who are charged with the responsibility for making these decisions.

Yet the draft is one of the most sacred taboos in American political life. For fifteen years Congress has tiptoed gingerly around the issue, extending the old Universal Military Training and Services Act of 1951 in off-election years after only the briefest of debates. Despite the efforts of a number of Congressmen to bring this issue out of the shadows of the Defense Department and into the public spotlight of the Congressional hearing process, criticism of the creaky and inefficient draft system has been inhibited by the label of "national security" and shelved in the limbo of countless executive commissions and "study groups."

Today the draft is facing a crisis which has revealed its weaknesses and inefficiencies to a wide segment of the public. The war in Vietnam, which has raised draft calls nearly to Korean War levels, coupled with a massive increase in the draft-age population which has meant that many more young men are no longer needed by the military services, has exposed the Selective Service System's antiquated machinery as inefficient, uneconomical and undemocratic. As a result, the public outcry from veterans of previous wars who have seen their sons pulled out of school, from civil rights workers who have dealt with lily-white draft boards in the South, from Congressmen who have been flooded with mail from confused, distraught parents and students, and from draft-age men themselves

who have suffered through the constant uncertainty of the draft has now reached mammoth proportions. Thus the publication of this book, the first careful and complete analysis of the draft since the 1951 House hearings on Universal Military Training, is especially significant.

In this comprehensive book, Mr. Chapman combines an intimate knowledge of American political life with a thorough background in the subject matter—gained as a reporter and as an editorial writer for the New York *Herald Tribune*. His study covers the most recent material available on the draft, including the "report on the report" issued by the Department of Defense on June 30, 1966, and the records of the 1966 House Armed Services Committee hearings on the Selective Service System. In his analysis, Mr. Chapman brings to light some of the significant inequities that have developed in the draft due to the rapid increase in population and the changing technological needs of the military. His proposals for a volunteer, career military force in place of the draft are not new, but the wealth of statistics and objective presentation of the subject make this book a valuable contribution to the public's and the Congress' consideration of this important national issue.

The importance of the draft lies in its function as a method of allocating our scarce resources of manpower between the military services and the civilian sector. The "river" of manpower, which Mr. Chapman describes, is a limited quantity and must be channeled efficiently to meet the demands of the military and also the needs of our booming civilian economy. As Mr. Chapman's research illustrates, the "dams" and "valves" which have been set up to meet the military's manpower needs have proved rusty with age. These archaic procedures have proved to be both a burden on the military, as the skills and experi-

ence level needed to man a modern army in which 80 percent of military occupations are noncombat jobs requiring specialized training are not available through the draft system, and a handicap to industries faced with an overwhelming economic demand for expanded services and more products and, at the same time, a dwindling supply of skilled manpower as a result of the draft's pressures.

If the draft is inefficient and inequitable—as it clearly is—then we must look for an alternate system of manpower allocation. Abolishing the draft and moving toward a volunteer military force with a strong citizen-Reserve is the solution most in accord with our national traditions. Mr. Chapman presents a forceful case for this approach, an approach which has received increased public attention in recent years but which, until now, has lacked the comprehensive and scholarly analysis that this book provides.

The Pentagon has thrown up a monetary barrier—variously estimated at four billion to twenty billion dollars—to a career, professional army; Mr. Chapman effectively pierces this barrier in his proposals for a volunteer force. The Pentagon has always considered the “cost” of a volunteer army in terms of the expense involved in “buying” the numbers of men (about 500,000) now being supplied through the draft or the threat of the draft. In its presentation to the 1966 House Armed Services hearings, the Defense Department presented its cost estimates solely in terms of the pay increases necessary to attract the same number of *initial* volunteers as are provided by the draft. In response to my written inquiry, the Defense Department elaborated on its stand by saying, “no estimates were made for the draft study of the combined effects of improvement in fringe benefits upon the rate of volunteering . . . [s]ince these benefits—with the exception of training and

educational opportunities—were not found to be effective inducements for initial enlistment . . .” This assumption is dubious, and in any case, the Defense Department has failed to take into account the effects of pay increases and better fringe benefits on *reenlistment*. In its expanded data in response to my questions, the Defense Department allowed only a mild increase of 10 percent in reenlistments as a result of pay increases. By separating the inducements necessary to raise reenlistments from those necessary to stimulate initial volunteering, the Defense Department has established an artificial barrier to a complete understanding of the military manpower problem.

As Mr. Chapman's figures—supported by the Defense Department's research—indicate, the reenlistment rate for inductees ranges from 3 to 10 percent, and the rate for all “first-termers” ranges from 17 to 25 percent. If this high turnover, amounting to a loss of 75 to 90 percent of all newly trained skilled personnel every two to three years, could be reduced through improved educational and other benefits, the need for new enlistments would drop sharply and the quality of trained personnel would rise as sharply. Thus the over-all cost of a volunteer army could be significantly below that estimated by the Defense Department. In addition, large savings could be made in training costs through expanded use of civilians in support positions and through increased use of the civilian vocational educational system in the training of noncombat military personnel.

Mr. Chapman's persuasive argument concentrates on the military effects of the draft and does not dwell on the adverse effects of this out-of-date system upon the civilian economy, but these effects further support his point of view. As a member of the House Ways and Means Committee

for fourteen years, and the Joint Economic Committee for twelve years, I have become involved in the difficult problem of finding ways to improve the quality and quantity of our nation's skills. The military services, both by their power to interfere—through the draft—in the orderly recruitment and training of skilled labor in the civilian market and by their own vast training establishment, play a major role in this process. A military recruitment system which utilized civilian-trained skills whenever possible, and which also trained more young men in skills that are in demand in the civilian economy, could contribute greatly to the development of America's manpower resources and reduce technological unemployment and the pressures of automation. That the present draft is a hindrance to this development, can be attested to by the personnel officers of dozens of American business firms who have had to fight for every trainee they could protect from the arbitrary and disparate standards of local draft boards. In this time of heavy manpower demand, it is essential that the training and procurement activities of the military and civilian sectors of our society be closely integrated to insure an adequate supply of skilled labor to both. The decentralized draft system, an anachronism in this age of automation, inhibits the growth of our industrial capacity as well as prevents the development of a modern, skilled professional military force.

The problem which Mr. Chapman discusses in this book is a complex one since it involves a consideration of the broad spectrum of social values, over-all manpower requirements and military necessities, yet it needs to be faced now. The Congress of the United States has a responsibility under the Constitution "to raise and support armies" and "to provide and maintain navies"; in this responsibility the

Congress has been sadly negligent over the past fifteen years. The rhetoric of what Mr. Chapman calls the "draft lobby" has subverted the deliberative and scholarly process of the Congress, by attaching the stigma of "tampering with the national defense" to all efforts to modernize our military manpower procurement and training system. A conscientious and complete Congressional study, a public study where witnesses can testify under cross-examination and rebuttal testimony can be offered, is badly needed if we are to modernize our manpower procurement policies and keep our people informed of the issues involved. The inertia of the vast bureaucracy that is the Armed Forces can only be overcome by an aroused, informed public demanding a fresh approach to this critical problem. Therefore, the publication of this knowledgeable and readable book must be welcomed by those of us in the Congress who have striven—so far in vain—to bring the draft and its problems to the forefront of public attention. The issues may be complex and may require difficult adjustments in our military forces, but the machinery of Congress is capable of making the necessary corrections if only it can be brought to bear on the problem. This book could well arouse the public and provide the force which gets the Congressional machinery moving.

PART I

*Our Manpower River and
the Draft's Dams*

Chapter 1

The Obsolete Draft

The United States today operates the world's most sophisticated weapons systems, constantly analyzed and frequently redesigned. Yet in the procurement of the most important element of national security—manpower—the nation's policies are antiquated, inefficient and uneconomical. Moreover, in the world's exemplary democracy, man, the ultimate weapon in the defense of freedom, is chosen for the American armed services in a system inherently unfree and coincidentally undemocratic.

Compulsory military service in the United States traditionally has been considered defensible only on the grounds that it is necessary, that it is universal in application and that it provides the men the military needs. From the uncritical and unreforming support of the draft by Congress during the fifteen years since the law was last examined with care, one might think that these conditions obtained. But they do not.

The draft, even during the high calls of the Vietnam engagement, is flooded with more registrants than it could possibly use, short of a mass world land-war; the "baby boom" of the last twenty years has come of age. The same unprecedented generational revolution which is restructuring every other area of society is pressing upon the military area as well, and with a booming economy to accompany it, has opened the possibility of all-volunteer armed services. And in the meantime it is annihilating any residual pretense of universality, and hence of fairness, in the so-called Universal Military Training and Service Act. Furthermore, despite the draft, and maybe because of it, the services are unable to maintain a proper inventory of skilled men, especially in the higher levels of operations. It must soon dawn on the public and the Government that the nation's compulsory system of military recruitment is a failure.

For many of the young, however, the draft is already worse than a failure. Like the "invisible poor" who have been incompetent to defend their own needs politically, most of the young men in America have been unable to articulate their anxieties and suspicions about the grim system that may or may not take, as tax due, two important years of their lives, and perhaps life itself.

Adult society is led by veterans of two great world wars, men who were young during a period whose psychology and technology are increasingly irrelevant to current conditions in the society and the military. They overlearned and oversimplified the late thirties' lesson of unpreparedness, and with scarcely a second look back, or a first look ahead, exalted the draft and its agency, the Selective Service System, into the realm of the unquestioned and almost the unquestionable.

Under such blighting indifference to changed circumstances, the generation of young men born since World War II has grown to maturity. They meet the draft in a Kafka-esque experience of bewilderment and frustration that most older adults do not understand. There are nowadays some sixty optional programs through which one can fulfill his military obligation, with a strange maze of attendant procedures and processes;¹ and there are countless ways of not serving at all. Despite such complexities, no counseling is made available to young men as a matter of course and even if one seeks out his draft board, the information supplied by the busy and businesslike clerk is likely to be skeletal. It is surprising that nearly all young men even know that they must go to their draft board to register at age 18, yet the law deals firmly indeed with him who does not. "Those registrants whose infractions of the law are not deliberate," reads a report by the Director of Selective Service, "usually are not brought to trial, but they are subject to accelerated induction into the Armed Forces and they occupy the highest position in the sequence of selection for induction."²

When a man does register he is given a tiny flyer whose chief function is to list the eighteen different categories of Selective Service classification—without explaining what they are and how one gets assigned to them. One is told that any appeal of classification must be entered to the local board in writing no more than ten days after notification, but one is not told under what circumstances an appeal should be made or what to put in the appeal. The terse flyer's parting shot is the hardly reassuring advice

¹ John Graham, "The Universal Military Obligation," *The Fund for the Republic, Inc.*, June, 1958.

² Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1965, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966, p. 22.

that "Classifications are subject to change by the local board at any time," and that "Failure to comply with an order from your local board may make you subject to fine or imprisonment."

Even a bright and determined young man—usually the one with bright and determined parents—might have a hard time compiling all the information relevant to his rights, obligations and choices. Yet at no single time does the Government or the educational system automatically provide the full facts of the draft and military service to youngsters who face it.

This alone is cruel neglect, for, as a consequence, most young men acquire their information about the draft by word-of-mouth, inevitably an incomplete and inaccurate source. Adding to the uncertainty is the information a young man also learns that the "universal" feature of the draft has become a sick joke, an officially sanctioned fraud. More than half of the nation's young men will never wear a uniform, either voluntarily through enlistment or involuntarily through the draft.³ That percentage, significantly, will rise still further in the next decade as the number of men turning draft age (18) each year—a figure which rose from some 1,150,000 in the late fifties to 1,800,000 today—rises to 2,100,000 in the mid-seventies.⁴

The draft is small enough to create a psychologically

³ Jack Raymond, "The Draft is Unfair," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 2, 1966.

⁴ The growth of the draft-age population will halt briefly in the 1980's as a result of the decreased birthrate of the 1960's. This present low number of births is attributable to the low number of adults now in the child-bearing age group 25 to 35. These adults are themselves the products of the extremely low birthrate of the Depression, and just as they were succeeded by a baby boom after World War II, the "baby boom" babies now swelling the draft rolls will soon be swelling the birthrate, and creating the men who will be turning 18 in the late 80's and early 90's.

GROWTH IN DRAFT-AGE POPULATION

Men turning 18, by year*	men 18-25, by year*
1958	1,164,000
1960	1,319,000
1962	1,402,000
1964	1,402,000
1965	1,898,000
1966	1,780,000
1968	1,768,000
1970	1,866,000
1972	1,969,000
1975	2,083,000
1980	2,132,000
	9,805,000
	10,215,000
	11,024,000
	11,693,000
	12,477,000
	(not available)
	(not available)
	15,129,000
	(not available)
	17,277,000
	18,702,000

* Years are fiscal years.

SOURCE: Bureau of the Census.

and sociologically damaging "evasion mentality," which, unhappily, expresses itself in regard to other public matters besides the draft. As Representative Robert Ellsworth (R-Kansas) has said, "Those who are unwillingly forced into the armed services—knowing as they do that their buddies on each side will not have to serve—can be expected to adopt evasion as a way of life. Throughout their military career they continually seek newer and more ingenious ways of shirking their responsibilities. And when they return to civilian life, should we be surprised when they fail to shoulder the burdens of citizenship and of active participation in endeavors for the common good?"⁵ The draft also can only encourage the "evasion mentality" in the 50 percent who do not serve, for, like Prohibition, universality under the present draft system is unenforceable and hence productive of cynicism all around.

Moreover, even when calls are low, the draft's very ex-

⁵ Representative Robert Ellsworth, *Congressional Record*, April 21, 1964.

istence is sufficient to compound the anxieties surrounding educational, career and marriage choices and, through the seduction of deferments, to distort those choices. For millions of young men the period after secondary school or college is a limbo of uncertainty and of attempts to extricate oneself from it. Prospective employers are particularly and understandably disinclined to hire and train young men who have yet to complete their military service, an attitude partly behind the statistic that unemployment for men under 22 is double that of men over 22.⁶ Yet if all the young men were suddenly infused with military patriotism and attempted to join the Armed Forces, either most would be turned down or the size of the forces would have to be doubled to accommodate them.

The way the Selective Service System has tried to control the disparity between limited manpower needs and the vast river of manpower flowing into the draft pool is a series of dams in the form of deferments and disqualifications. Manipulation of the valves on these dams has become so extensive, decentralized and occult as to defy proper overseeing by either the public or the Congress.

⁶ Representative Robert A. Taft, Jr., *Congressional Record*, April 21, 1964.

Chapter 2

Scholars, Fathers, Farmers, Reservists

The most important man behind the dams and operating the valves is Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey, the draft's 72-year-old architect and the continuing Director of the Selective Service System. Hershey, a benign old veteran of World War I, actually was head of the modern draft before there was one, having been appointed executive officer of the joint Army and Navy Selective Service Commission in 1936. From that post he was promoted to Selective Service Director when the first version of the present draft was enacted in 1940. Hershey thereby counts as one of the most enduring figures in the Federal Government. He has the appearance and manner of a country storekeeper, hardworking and outspoken, but often imprecise. A staff man on the Senate Armed Services Committee, whose employers are seldom critical of General Hershey's establishment, observes, "Hershey's a fine man, but sometimes it's difficult to understand just what he means. He

speaks in parables, even as a witness before Congress." When General Hershey made an oblique reference in a magazine interview to the possibility of drafting certain men in the Reserves who had not been trained, a high-ranking officer in the Pentagon's news office could only mutter, "I wish General Hershey would stop holding press conferences!"

General Hershey personally may exasperate colleagues in the military manpower business, but for years there has been general acceptance of his policies, and while he frequently reminds his critics that he is only the humble servant of the Congress, the latter has let him do rather much what he pleased most of the time, and he is proud of his record of support.

Hershey is especially proud that the draft, as he sees it, has used its deferments to promote and protect the society's larger interests. Through the draft, he believes, people are "channeled" into activities and situations whose public value has been certified by the Government and General Hershey.

Something can be said for this policy; namely, that in time of war, valuable personnel, such as teachers, key defense industry workers and fathers of large families would not be pressed into military service. Some of the most promising future leaders of Great Britain and France were among the first mustered into battle in World War I, and killed.

But a great deal more can be said against "channeling," particularly as it now operates. John V. Lindsay, as a Congressman in 1964, attacked the Selective Service's approach as an attempt "to influence young men into jobs that relate to the Cold War, that enhance the position of the military in our society." Lindsay quoted General Her-

shey's description of the deferment as "'the carrot that we have used to try to get individuals into occupations and professions that are said by those in charge of government to be the necessary ones.'" Deferments then," charged Lindsay, "are extended to nuclear scientists, but not to classicists, sociologists or political scientists, who, says the government are less essential to national security. Thus, in the name of 'national security' and 'government interest,' the future course of emphasis in our society may be changed by the state, indeed by the military apparatus."⁷

Selective Service Classifications

CLASS I

- Class I-A: Available for military service.
- Class I-A-O: Conscientious objector available for noncombatant military service only.
- Class I-C: Member of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, or the Public Health Service.
- Class I-D: Qualified member of reserve component, or student taking military training, including ROTC and accepted aviation cadet applicant.
- Class I-O: Conscientious objector available for civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest.
- Class I-S: Student deferred by law until graduation from high school or attainment of age of 20, or until end of his academic year at a college or university.
- Class I-W: Conscientious objector performing civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the

⁷ Representative John V. Lindsay, *Congressional Record*, April 21, 1964.

national health, safety, or interest, or who has completed such work.

Class I-Y: Registrant qualified for military service only in time of war or national emergency.

CLASS II

Class II-A: Occupational deferment (other than agricultural and student).

Class II-C: Agricultural deferment.

Class II-S: Student deferment.

CLASS III

Class III-A: Extreme hardship deferment, or registrant with a child or children.

CLASS IV

Class IV-A: Registrant with sufficient prior military service or who is a sole surviving son.

Class IV-B: Official deferred by law.

Class IV-C: Alien not currently liable for military service.

Class IV-D: Minister of religion or divinity student.

Class IV-F: Registrant not qualified for any military service.

CLASS V

Class V-A: Registrant over the age of liability for military service.

Moreover, the deferment categories are loosely drawn so they may be generously inclusive when the manpower pool is growing or stringently exclusive when manpower is scarce. As a result, the categories internally evidence repeated inequities when examined case by case. One notable example, which received publicity because of its proximity to the Presidential family, was the III-A deferment given Lynda Bird Johnson's actor-beau, George Hamilton, because his mother is his "dependent." In reality, Hamil-

ton has two working brothers, a Hollywood mansion and an income of some \$200,000 annually, and if indeed his mother is personally impoverished it would seem that Hamilton would still be able to provide for her during two years' absence. One cannot know—the Selective Service will not discuss the case—but it is quite possible Hamilton merely applied for his initial deferment during a time when the Selective Service was trying to contract the manpower pool and was willing to accept virtually anyone's claim for special treatment.

Externally, the deferment categories also can be criticized for the very priorities they promote. Some 250,000 men are deferred because they are judged to have jobs "necessary to the nation's welfare," although it is highly problematical what men can really be "necessary" at such an age and even more dubious whether local draft boards or even the Selective Service national headquarters should be allowed to determine just who they are. A young salesman or entrepreneur can be ruined financially by being drafted, but usually has no defense under the "necessary to the nation's welfare" description, yet for outmoded reasons dating back—as so much of the present law does—to World War II, farm boys are deferred in many areas, despite the present national food surplus. It can be said that the farm boys usually deferred are "only sons" and that their presence is essential to the farm's welfare—if not to the country's—but the same protection is not provided at all for men in most other businesses.

Even the deferment for fathers—perhaps the most reasonable and popular category of all, with some 3,500,000 registrants—can be challenged on the basis of equity. In a critique prepared for the Fund for the Republic, John Graham acknowledged a few years ago that "Induction

might work a greater hardship on men with children, especially since the lower ranks cannot take their families with them overseas. Moreover, induction of fathers is more expensive because of the family allowance they receive. But men who become fathers after they are inducted are not protected from assignment overseas . . . And if inequality of liability for compulsory military service can be rationalized solely on the basis of a minor saving in defense costs, democratic principles are being denied for a handful of silver. It has been known ever since the 1951 act that military service would be universal and continuing. When men choose to ignore the dislocating effects which their military service would have on a family, and marry and have children just the same they should not be rewarded with a draft exemption. It is unfair to those who recognized the obligation and postponed marriage and children until they had completed their military service.”⁸

Unquestionably the deferment for fathers tends to accelerate early marriages. Therefore one might also challenge General Hershey to defend the “channeling” effects of hurrying young people into premature matrimony that statistically stands a better than average chance of ending in divorce.

It is the student deferment, however, that causes the most resentment. Some 1,900,000 college men presently hold such a deferment, and of course—as with fathers—much can be said for their delay of service. For one thing, unlike most other categories of deferment, students really are only deferred and not placed in so low a priority that the “deferment” is effectively an exemption. At the end of the student’s scholastic career he is still liable for service and, indeed, virtually all of the officers in the Armed Forces

⁸ Graham, *op. cit.*

are recruited from college graduates. Even during World War II, when there was a manpower shortage, some students were kept in school, not only because many would become officer candidates upon graduation but because they included most of the nation’s future leaders and the memory of World War I—of the sacrifices of England and France—argued for their preservation.

But the college deferment has become encrusted with contradictions, favoritism and unpredictability, all of which are perfectly understood by the Pentagon and the Selective Service System and are tolerated. Since 26 is the effective draft-age limit, some students have attempted to stay in school until that age, and the Selective Service’s attitude toward those persons and all graduate students has fluctuated over the years not on the basis of principle but on the size of the current manpower pool. Since the military’s manpower increases for the Vietnam war began to deplete the draft pool, the Selective Service has begun to tighten up on student deferments, and its method for doing so is building ever greater inequities into the deferment procedures. Students from better schools are discriminated against because one of the standards by which local draft boards are asked to judge whether a student deferment should be given is class standing, and obviously this measure is rigged for the student whose performance is only average but who nonetheless can appear in the top of his class at an inferior college, while a much better student might still appear in only the lower level of his class at an outstanding college.

The other measure used in judging students is the Selective Service College Qualification Test, and as General Hershey freely admits, such an examination “only has the appearance of being fair. It tends to get cocked over to-

ward the mathematical," he says, "because it's easier to grade for one thing."⁹ Since a number of questions assume a familiarity with some algebra and geometry, the non-math specialist in graduate school or the last year of college, who probably hasn't worked out an equation since early in his high school career, seven or eight years before, is at a loss. Any student—math or non-math—has some understanding of the general questions that test, for example, how well one can sort out the facts from a couple of paragraphs of reading material, but mathematics questions—nearly half of the test—require intellectual tools the liberal arts student seldom if ever uses. Surely skill with algebra or geometry should not determine whether a law, art or education student may continue his work.

But not only does the test favor the mathematics student over the generalist, the local boards tend to do the same. "I know," says Hershey, "they'll defer a scientist before somebody who is teaching music. I know they'll defer an engineer before somebody doing something else. Biology is give-and-take. Sometimes they think these biologists are going to be in a position to kill everybody in the world, and they'll go a long way to defer one. Sometimes they don't know what biology is—if they think it's botany, they won't go so far."¹⁰ Hershey seems to feel this prejudice is unfor-

⁹ Interview, *U.S. News and World Report*, January 10, 1966. General Hershey has since asserted, in response to the author's citing his quotation in a *Reporter* magazine article, that he was talking about the Korean War College Qualification Test and not the present one, which at the time of the *U.S. News* interview had not yet been prepared. However, his *U.S. News* statement, which Hershey had full opportunity to correct before publication, did not make any distinction among examinations, and, in fact, the new test is also "cocked over toward the mathematical," as many students who have taken it will aver.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

fortunate, but also, one gathers, inevitable, for he gives no indication of requiring the local boards to treat all students equally. Whether the Selective Service wills it or not, then, the bias for the mathematics and science students is yet another example of the draft's "channeling" of people's interests and careers.

When faced with criticism of the new student deferment procedures, defenders of the draft point out that only a small percentage of students have yet been called, that the tests and class standings are being assessed just in case. "The probable net effect of our buildup," says Mr. Harold Wool, Director for Manpower Procurement Policy in the Pentagon, "has been to increase the number of boys going to college."¹¹ That, he suggests, is good. But is it? If it is bad to take students out of college, is it much better to artificially stimulate enrollment? Even if draft officials were to assert that this particular development was not conscious "channeling," the practical effect has been to glut the colleges and especially the graduate schools with more students than they can handle and probably more students than will apply a trained intelligence and a good learning attitude to their work.

No matter how the new "educational" deferment policy works, education is not served, and since supposedly the students with the lowest level of intelligence are to be reclassified and drafted, if any are, it is hard to see how the military is going to benefit very much either.

The fact of all deferments under the present system is that they are inherently unfair and compound that unfairness in practice. The home comforts, scholastic opportunities, career advances and the incomes of the deferred are

¹¹ Interview, February 2, 1966.

all enjoyed at the cost of the unfortunate draftee, underpaid, separated from home, job, friends and liberty. For indeed, real fairness and protecting critical civilian interests are only subsidiary functions of the deferments, whose central purpose is to protect the technical concept of universality in the draft.

As the burgeoning population of the young began to manifest itself in the 1950's, the deferment policies of the Selective Service became looser and looser, and great leeway was given local boards to broaden the interpretation of regulations for the policies that were in effect. Thus, an "essential" factory worker was often merely an important one, a "hardship" was merely an inconvenience, and a "student" was merely a young man taking one course in night school. President Kennedy's Executive Order giving married men without children a lowered induction priority had little basis in "fairness," but it did help absorb some of the flooding 1-A category of draft registrants until it was no longer needed after the Vietnam buildup began and was revoked by President Johnson in August, 1965.

The two biggest dams built to hold back the over-all manpower flow into the 1-A pool are those setting the effective draft-age limit at 26 and creating a Reserve Enlistment Program, the participation in which earns one a deferment.

President Eisenhower, by Executive Order in 1956, placed men aged 26 to 35 in a low priority category of the draft pool, effectively exempting them from service once they reach that age. This change was welcomed by the Department of Defense as well as the Selective Service System, for it was quite clear that the best soldiers were men inducted at a relatively early age when they were less set in

their ways. It was also popular with the general public which has consistently supported drafting at an earlier rather than a later age.¹²

The deferment for reservists was a feature of the Reserve Enlistment Program enacted by Congress in 1955. Under this program, a man may opt to join the Army, Air Force, Marine or Coast Guard Reserves, or the Army or Air National Guards. An active duty stint of four to six months usually is followed by four drills a month (or one full weekend a month) and two weeks of summer camp over a period of six years of total obligation. Other Reserve obligations, some enforced, some not, still obtain for veterans of the regular Armed Forces. John Graham's Fund for the Republic report described the new Reserve Enlistment Program as "barren of any justification in military necessity; in fact, the House Committee report on the bill (the Reserve Forces Act of 1955) labeled it a 'control factor' over the manpower pool. It was no more than a device for soaking up the manpower surplus and ensuring the universality of the military obligation."¹³

At first the program was open only to men between 17

¹² However, until the Vietnam buildup lowered the average age at which draft boards were inducting, men were being called at about age 22½. That this was an unpopular situation was demonstrated by a Gallup Poll of November, 1963 (published December 4, 1963), which asked, "If you had a son who had to spend two years in the military service, at what age would you like to have him begin this service?" The answers were:

16-17	6%	20	11%
18	48%	21	18%
19	9%	22-26	8%

Department of Defense statistics of June, 1966, showed that the median age of inductees was still 20¼ years. The Pentagon has since suggested the possibility of drafting first at the lower ages.

¹³ Graham, *op. cit.*

and 18½, who were to fulfill an eight-year obligation. But by 1957 the program was opened to all draft eligibles and the total obligation time cut in varying amounts.

Needless to say, the Reserve Enlistment Program has been enormously popular with young men seeking to avoid the draft. But it has not been spectacularly successful, as indicated by its dubious beginnings and the Reserve cut-backs of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in 1965. The Reserve program clearly is the Defense Department's stepchild. Top generals display little knowledge of its operation when testifying before Congress, and the normally quite competent Pentagon Public Affairs division does not even have on hand information on the total number of reservists in the various branches.

Consequently, the nation has a Reserve program today that is probably as deserving of thorough investigation and reorganization as the draft itself. According to the Pentagon,¹⁴ 132,000 men in the Ready Reserves (including the Army and Air National Guards) have not even been sent for basic training. The Berlin Crisis call-up of 1961 demonstrated the general flaccidity of the Reserves when they are activated, and despite attempts at improvement since then, the large number of untrained reservists now in the program suggests that most units have little more than a "psychological deterrence" value as far as the enemy is concerned—which, indeed, is often the apology made for them. (Presumably the enemy doesn't really know their true condition.)¹⁵

Reserve units since 1955 typically attract in the lower

¹⁴ Department of Defense, Public Affairs, June 8, 1966.

¹⁵ A National Guard slogan of recent years was "You Can Sleep Tonight, Your National Guard Is Awake," ubiquitously corrupted among reservists to "You Can Sleep Tonight, Your National Guard Is."

ranks a large number of college graduates whose native intelligence is often greater and whose weekday civilian positions, even at such an early age, are more elevated than their Reserve superiors', but whose attitudes toward the Reserves are frankly exploitative—avoidance of the draft—and cynical, and whose dismay with the scheduled annual depresses their own and others' morale.

It is questionable whether four to six months' training followed by one weekend a month of drills under such an atmosphere of dissatisfaction and skepticism really make a man or a unit fit for combat or even active duty. Perhaps they can be trained adequately in six weeks or two months, but so, almost, could entirely new people, and the fact is that most national emergencies, the technical excuse for Reserve activation,¹⁶ wouldn't give much time for either. Not all units, of course, deserve a blanket dismissal, for some are highly competent, and many dedicated and knowledgeable men serve in the Reserves at all levels. But surely, over-all, veterans of the regular services, serving in a compulsory Reserve system, with good pay and perhaps a one year full-time program for highly paid volunteers to supplement them, would be more effective in the larger defense scheme. The President could mobilize such career Reserves at any time, with a clear conscience socially, politically and militarily.

In the Vietnam situation, the failure to call up the Reserves has proved almost as embarrassing as was calling them up in the Berlin Crisis. Many Congressmen have de-

¹⁶ The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as amended, declares that Reserves "are maintained for the purpose of providing trained units and qualified individuals to be available for active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require."

manded activation in the name of fairness and, woe to that abused virtue, set about in August, 1966, to provide it with so-called equality of service legislation. Senator Richard Russell (D-Georgia), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has noted that some men join the Reserves to avoid longer service; he has persuaded Congress, therefore, to authorize activation of all or a portion of such individual reservists who have completed no more than six months of active duty.

Thus did Congress put itself in the hypocritical position of guessing the motivation of a whole category of men which Congress itself had created through the Reserve Enlistment Program. Once it encouraged such men; now it punishes them.

It was asked how we could allow one man to serve only six months as a reservist while his neighbor was being drafted to serve in Vietnam. It might better be asked how fairness is achieved by sending certain individual reservists to Vietnam while millions of regulars will never serve there and while many more millions of young men will never serve in the military, in any capacity, anywhere.

The present Reserve system is properly seen as one more misbegotten child of the so-called Universal Military Training and Service Act. All any of the legislation supporting it accomplishes is to perpetuate the myth that the Act and the draft are universal.

Chapter 3

Disqualifications: "One Half of the Nation"

The largest dam of all those used by the draft to reduce to a manageable trickle its increasing flow of available manpower is the category of "not qualified"—men who cannot meet the military's mental, physical and moral standards.

Nearly five million draft registrants are now listed as 4-F (unfit) or 1-Y (qualified only in case of an all-out war). The 4-F category is considered permanently deferred, that is, exempted, and the 1-Y is subject to rechecking when manpower needs increase, as they have since mid-1965 because of the Vietnam War.

For several years a number of social critics have used the statistics of draft rejection to demonstrate an alarming trend toward illiteracy and physical decay among the nation's youth. Perhaps it is an extension of the period of self-flagellation the country went through after the Soviets orbited Sputnik.

The attention such criticism focused upon the mental, emotional and physical problems of youth certainly has helped make Americans more alert to dealing with them. The worried observation that youngsters nowadays lack the handy swimming holes and sandlots their parents enjoyed as children (or was it their grandparents?) and are dubiously blessed with the sedentary seduction of television has led educators and parents to improve community recreation centers and physical education programs in the schools beyond anything they experienced themselves as children. "Fat dripping prosperity," to use Carl Sandburg's phrase, may have put houses over the old sandlot, but it also made available more summer camps in the country, swimming pools in many back yards and Ping-pong tables in many basements. It produced school lunch programs and made good food available to a wider spectrum of society than ever before. As for intellect, money available for education has never been so abundant as now.

But the draft rejection statistics did appear formidable. In 1965 a former planning officer in the Selective Service System's national headquarters, Colonel George H. Walton (U.S.A.R.—Ret.), published a book, *The Wasted Generation*,¹⁷ detailing the sordid statistics of draft failures. The Colonel's well-meaning dismay hinged chiefly on the rising rejection rate since the Korean War, when 37 percent of the examined registrants were disqualified. "From the end of the war through 1961 the rate of rejection rose to 49 percent," cried Walton. "For 1962 it was 54 percent. When, in May, 1962, the rejection rate reached 56 percent, the figure was considered a freak. But the average rejection rate in 1963 was 56.1 percent. In

¹⁷ Colonel George Walton, *The Wasted Generation*, Chilton Books, Philadelphia, 1965.

1964, the rate rose still more and reached an all time high with a yearly disqualification rate of 57.9 percent."¹⁸

That did sound rather alarming, all right, and it was not very comforting to learn, through an interview Colonel Walton granted to *This Week* magazine in March of 1966,¹⁹ the following:

"Q. Colonel Walton, what is the rejection rate for today's draftees?

A. It is now over 50 percent—and it's still rising.

Q. Unbelievable! . . ."

Unbelievable, indeed, since according to the Pentagon the rejection rate for March, 1966, the month of the *This Week* interview, had fallen to 40 percent, and the subsequent month of April it went down to 39 percent, nearly the Korean War level.

What can explain this miraculous amelioration of health and intellect among our recently decrepit youth? Perhaps they read Colonel Walton's book and, in shame, swiftly set about a rigorous course of home improvement.

Certainly the good news came as a relief to the Census Bureau. In his book, *This U.S.A.*, based on Census surveys and written in collaboration with Richard M. Scammon, Director of the Bureau of the Census, Ben J. Wattenberg had already reported, "In the age bracket 14-24 the national illiteracy rate is only 0.6%—or about one in one hundred and seventy—nearly negligible from a statistical point of view. . . . In short, there are almost no young illiterates in America."²⁰

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2. Actually, Walton's figures, the Selective Service Report of 1965 shows, are somewhat exaggerated.

¹⁹ "Why Half Our Draftees Flunk," *This Week*, March 13, 1966.

²⁰ Ben J. Wattenberg, in collaboration with Richard S. Scam-

No illiterates? Colonel Walton's draft statistics seemed to contradict those of the Census. "One in every four draftees examined is rejected for illiteracy," he declared in March. And what is more remarkable, "Three out of four of these illiterates had finished the eighth grade, half had completed nine-and-a-half years of school, twenty percent actually had been graduated from high school and a few had been graduated from colleges."²¹

These grade school, high school and college graduates who are illiterate, as judged by the draft, are not malingering, for the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT), administered after the pre-induction physical at the Army induction and examination centers, was especially designed by a panel of psychologists to expose the fakers. Colonel Walton thinks these "educated illiterates," as he calls them, are simply the products of our debauched prosperity. But a safer guess is that Colonel Walton was calling "illiterate" all men who flunk the AFQT—though half of the questions test mechanical ability (identification of various machine parts and tools) and comprehension of spatial relationships. A literate person, even a college graduate, could easily do poorly on these sections. More indicative of the draft's standards for illiteracy, however, is the fact that the flunk level on the AFQT is set now at the 31st percentile; that is, if the test were given to a real cross section of Americans, 30 percent would fail. In other words the test is designed so that in a representative sample, three out of ten people would fail no matter how well they did. When we become a nation that graduates everyone from at least high school—and it is the younger gener-

mon, *This U.S.A., An Unexpected Family Portrait of 194,067,296 Americans Drawn from the Census*, Doubleday, New York, 1965.

²¹ *This Week*, op. cit.

ation distressing Colonel Walton that is achieving this goal—then *all* people below the draft's arbitrary 31st percentile score will be high school graduates. But the country will be better off, not worse. A great many people then would be failed who really were smarter than those passing today, just as many are being flunked today who are much smarter than draftees of the past.

Perhaps recognizing this, the Defense Department in November, 1965, modified its test requirements so that *high school graduates* who score in the 16th percentile or higher on the AFQT will be considered acceptable. Of course, if they really *are* acceptable, one wonders why non-high school graduates, who score, say, at the 30th percentile, are considered not acceptable. The same is worth asking as regards high school graduates who attempt to enlist: a score of 31 for enlistees is still required.

So, by regulation, a man who is a high school graduate and scores only 16 is judged to be smarter than a non-high school graduate who scores 30, and a high school graduate who is acceptable to the draft because he scores between 16 and 31 is not acceptable when he is tested as a volunteer. Under these standards some of Colonel Walton's "illiterates" are plainly brighter than some certified "literate" by the military's own, very curious test.²²

There is no backsliding occurring in American physical or intellectual prowess; indeed, statistics show that at least in the matter of educational achievement, this generation of young men is the most advanced in history. The reason for the rising rejection rate until late 1965 was the rising number of young men coming of draft age and the neces-

²² The Army itself, in response to criticism from educators, dropped the word "illiterate" from its description of AFQT rejectees, but Colonel Walton declares that this was simply to avoid "war with civilian educators."

sity of cutting down that number—in terms of the 1-A pool.

The Vietnam buildup, with its increase within one year of 400,000 men, allowed the draft to take a higher proportion of men tested, and hence the lower rejection rates.

The valves on this particular manpower dam can be controlled much as those for deferments. Congress gives the Defense Department and the Selective Service System considerable margin for changing standards. "Except in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress," the Army may reject at any level it likes above the tenth percentile on the AFQT. (Presumably, during a war the Congress does not want the Army to be so selective, which raises the question of why the present rejection score is the 31st percentile even though we are at war in Vietnam. The answer, of course, is that the Vietnam war is not "declared.")

Consequently, one can see that draft rejections went up when mental standards were raised between 1958 and 1963 and declined after the lowering of standards in late 1965.²³

Almost as influential, and maybe more so, are the individual judgments, the informal day-to-day standards of the draft boards and the induction centers. Some men are rejected out-of-hand by recruiting agents and through cursory medical checks at draft boards and are not even sent to take the Army physical or mental tests. In some areas, particularly in Southern states, draft boards also feel free independently to reject men as illiterates, though such informal testing is not justifiable under the Universal Mili-

²³ As this book went to press, in November, 1966, standards were again lowered as Secretary McNamara decided to "salvage" about 40,000 rejectees, conveniently coincident with an increase in the draft call for October.

tary Training and Service Act.²⁴ Colonel Walton sees this as evidence that the total number of young men are even worse off than the rejection rates from the induction centers show. But is it not more likely that this represents one more control on the manpower valves?

Standards for the men who do reach the induction centers tend to be loose, too, especially for physical and moral tests. The moral test can be very perfunctory indeed: a list of Communist and Fascist organizations taken from the Attorney General's subversive list is waved under a registrant's nose and he is given virtually no time to examine it before affirming that he has never been a member or attended meetings of such organizations. Or the moral test can be more leisurely, and a man with insufficient moral standing for the Army can be one with a record of civil disobedience in a civil rights demonstration or with a series of unpaid traffic fines.

The medical examination is more flexible yet, and varies wildly from region to region and time to time. Some men during 1964 and 1965 were amazed at how willing examining doctors were to disqualify them for medical problems, while during the current buildup clerks have actually been known to erase evidence of disqualifying disabilities on a registrant's charts. There is a trend toward high rejection rates when the international situation appears calm and the number of men needed is relatively small, and toward correspondingly low rates when the size of the military is expanding or the international situation appears heated. The induction examinations (after a man is actually notified of his induction) reflect this trend more clearly than pre-induction examinations, which are planned many weeks ahead. Thus in mid-1961, with the first wave

²⁴ Walton, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

of the baby boom and before President Kennedy's enlargement of the Armed Forces by nearly 300,000 men, the induction rejections ran as high as 72 percent, while at the year's end, during the Berlin Crisis, the induction rejection rate went down to 14 percent.²⁵ It definitely appears that the man found "unfit" in May would have been quite acceptable in December, depending more on the health of world affairs than on his.

Colonel Walton described these pre-induction and induction physical examinations as "probably the first and certainly the most thorough (the typical registrant) has ever had."²⁶ Perhaps a small percentage of young men in America have never had a physical examination before the Army treats them to one, but many public schools and most colleges, summer camps and other institutions and organizations require them; and if by "thorough" is meant "extensive," the Army physical is thorough, but it most certainly is not careful.

Countless young men who have been through the assembly line at induction centers can attest to its farcical and slipshod administration, but General Hershey of the Selective Service System, whose agency only sends men to the induction centers that the Army runs, was one of the most persuasive commentators during a *U.S. News* interview in early 1966:

Q. [Are the induction centers] efficiently run?

A. They're doing their best. The trouble is, how do you go from handling 4,000 men a month to 40,000—just like

²⁵ Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1965, *op. cit.*

²⁶ Walton, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

that? Of course, their people said, "Go out and hire more doctors." All right, they hire doctors. Whom do they get?

Two kinds: One is the doctor from the service, who is the boy who was an intern last year, and he's doing his two years of compulsory duty in uniform. So he goes down to the induction station and he's in charge; a kid who's learned a little about disease but doesn't know much about what a well man looks like. But he's supposed to be picking out the "wells," not the sick.

Then he has to hire somebody to help him. Usually, all you can get is part-time doctors. Generally, that means the ones who have a little spare time and these are the ones who haven't got many patients.

You also need clerks. "Well," you say, "why worry about clerks?"

I'm worrying a great deal, because when a doctor goes down a line of naked men saying what's wrong with each one of them and a clerk is coming along behind him copying down what the doctor says, and when he gets through that, the clerk doesn't know what he's written, or he doesn't understand all the terms—then the poor doctor sits down and says, "I wonder what I could have said there about that man."²⁷

There is no way of telling how many men shouldn't be in the Army because of medical or moral or mental reasons and yet are, nor how many are not in who should be. The young men who experience the scandalously haphazard induction center physical and moral examination have never been polled and their voice of protest against its inequities is inhibited by their inexperience and the draft's omnipresent threat. Army and Selective Service officials, including General Hershey and Colonel Walton, very

²⁷ *U.S. News*, *op. cit.*

properly have urged remedial programs for those men who fail the Army's tests. But how can such a program be undertaken while inefficiency, managed statistics and injustice becloud the question of just who really needs help?

Chapter 4

The Leaky Dams

General Hershey acknowledged being "worried" about the way in which the Selective Service System's partner in the draft process—the Army—runs its induction center tests.

But the general's own organization manages to equal the inefficiency and resultant injustices of the Army's testing. The inequities inherent in the draft's conscious deferment policies are compounded by simple incompetence.

One of the most disturbing cases is the system's present College Qualification Test created to help local draft boards decide whom to grant a college deferment and whom to classify 1-A and induct. As General Hershey conceded (see Chapter 2), the test and the local boards are somewhat biased in favor of science and mathematics students.

But even competence in a number of fields might not suffice for a student taking the remarkable College Qualification Test. Contracted by the Selective Service System to

the low-bidding Science Research Associates of Chicago for preparing, administering and scoring, the first tests were given to one million students on May 14, May 21, June 3, and June 24, 1966. Much of the detailed work of administration was handled by computers, and a number of blunders were reported to the news media. Instructions were sent to the wrong addresses, students were told to report to wrong, often distant, testing locations, and at those locations they sometimes found an inadequate supply of examination forms. Not alarming mistakes, until one realizes that the same machines operated by the same people were also doing the scoring.

Worst of all, however, if the sample test released by the Selective Service System is at all indicative, the examination actually is grossly misleading in some questions, amateurish in the presentation of others (according to a leading testing expert²⁸) and on at least one of the thirty questions in the sample, plainly *wrong*.

The test instructions warn that "each question is followed by five suggested answers, only *one* of which is correct" (original emphasis).²⁹ Multiple choice questions—used exclusively on the draft's college test—are among the most primitive and deceptive of testing devices and many colleges have virtually abandoned their use. Their only clear value is ease in grading, which is of small solace to the potential draftee whose academic career is in the balance. A complete dolt can provide a large fraction of the answers to multiple choice questions just by guessing; his chances are one in five. But a smart student on the draft's

²⁸ Dr. Banesh Hoffmann, professor of mathematics at Queens College, New York City, and author of *The Tyranny of Testing*. I am deeply indebted to him for his information and suggestions.

²⁹ Selective Service College Qualification Test, Bulletin of Information, p. 11.

College Qualification Test is actually at a disadvantage. An example provided by testing-expert Dr. Banesh Hoffmann was one in which the student is asked to answer a question whose choices include "B—inert gas . . . D—gas." "The wanted answer," observes Hoffmann, "is B and though it may be better than D it shows that D is also correct. Thus the presence of D gives the lie to the testers' assertion that 'only *one* (answer) is correct'. . . . It is unbecoming for testers to tell lies in public."³⁰

A number of other questions have such similar and both correct choices as answers, yet the computer marks only one right per question.

Several of the thirty questions of those supplied the public by the Selective Service revolve around one of A. E. Housman's poems, worth quoting here, as in the test:

Loveliest of trees, the cherry now
Is hung with bloom along the bough
And stands about the woodland ride
Wearing white for Eastertide.

Now, of my threescore years and ten,
Twenty will not come again,
And take from seventy springs a score,
It only leaves me fifty more.

And since to look at things in bloom
Fifty springs are little room,
About the woodlands I will go
To see the cherry hung with snow.

One question asks which of five given words in the poem is "used as a descriptive figure of speech," and yet at least three of the choices qualify as "descriptive figures of

³⁰ Letter to the Editor, *The New York Times Magazine*, May 8, 1966.

speech." Another question asks what "feeling does the poet express in this passage?" and of the five "feelings" given, at least three should be correct. But that is an opinion (one shared, however, by many persons who have taken the test); yet another question is:

How old was the poet when he wrote this poem?

- A-20
- B-40
- C-50
- D-70
- E-One cannot tell.

The answer the computer would grade "correct" is "A-20," but Housman, as of course is common with poets, was not necessarily writing an autobiography and certainly not a precise autobiography. In fact the record shows³¹ that Housman wrote the poem when he was 36. A bad question in any case, its answer should have been "E-One cannot tell." Housman himself might have admonished the Selective Service: "Even when poetry has a meaning, as it usually has, it may be inadvisable to draw it out."³²

There are at least eight exceptionable questions out of the Selective Service's sample thirty—over 20 percent. Scholars and other critics have had opportunity to challenge the College Qualification Test, but that is a chance the unfortunate student never gets.

Someone certainly will propose that the injustices, blatant and subtle, of the College Qualification Test can be patched up with a new try by the testers, perhaps using a group of competent educators to check on accuracy and

³¹ Tom Burns Haber, *The Manuscript Poems of A. E. Housman*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1955, pp. 13-14.

³² A. E. Housman, *The Name and Nature of Poetry*, Macmillan, New York, 1933.

presentation. But the Selective Service System is already working with a law and regulations that are a patchwork so worn that the new sewing of a tatter in one place exposes another somewhere else.

A good example is the Selective Service System's attempt to repair what some critics considered a dangerous loophole for draft evasion, the possibility of staying in graduate school until after one had passed the effective draft-age limit of 26. A few men undoubtedly did take advantage of the loophole, and as povertarians like Michael Harrington have pointed out, they tended to be the men who could afford the advanced education. But more talked about it than seriously contemplated it and more contemplated than acted. The ordinary age for a graduate of college is 21 and a master's degree normally requires only one year, a business school degree two years, a law degree three years and a non-medical doctorate four years. Draft boards already looked askance, with only partial justification, upon men who jumped from degree to degree, especially in different fields (e.g., a business degree followed by a doctorate in science) and they knew just how long was required to earn each degree. So it was very hard for even a conscientious draft-evader to stretch a one-to-four-year degree candidacy into the five years separating him from his college diploma and the "safety age" of 26. The only really promising means necessitated thinking far ahead, and at age 19 or so taking a leave of absence from college for a year or two while one was still below the age at which most draft boards were inducting men (about age 22½ until the Vietnam buildup of 1965). During his leave of absence, the draft-evader was 1-A but not likely to be called. Then the stealthy draft-evader would return to school, be graduated at, say, 23, and have only to find a

three- or four-year graduate program in order to sail past age 26 as a deferred student. Other variations of the far-sighted ploy were, for example, to stay in college continuously, but take only a few courses and drag out the process a year or so longer than normal and then repeat the pattern in graduate school. The Peace Corps probably accepted several thousand college graduate applicants a year whose altruism was mixed, as motivation is usually mixed—even in the Peace Corps—who intended to obtain graduate student deferment after their Peace Corps deferment ran out.

To snare such malingerers—and silence some critics—the Selective Service System in 1965 really began to enforce its regulation that a student is only eligible for a deferment if he is pursuing “a full-time normal course of study,” with “full-time” defined by each board and “normal” as “four years of high school followed by four years of college with no interruptions.”

It is questionable how many real evaders were thereby foiled, or really how important it is to make sure that every man on his way to becoming a professor, attorney or scientist be rescued for the infantry before he turns 26. In any case, though the game’s rules are a little stricter now, a clever and determined draft-evader can still educate himself out of the draft if he is willing to make the effort.

But the new net catches a great many other fish, men who are being harassed and frequently inducted to satisfy a bureaucratic dictum. The crime of some is to get sick—for example, with mononucleosis—at some point and have to leave college for a period. Others are late adolescents having difficulty adjusting to academic discipline, who have been advised by counselors to take out a year to straighten out their emotional problems. In the vortex of

idealism, high intelligence, and assaulted sensitivity that characterize the emotional growth of many college students, a year of meaningful work away from the campus often is highly advisable. But the draft is hardly good therapy for most emotional problems, and, sadly, many men who should be taking a break are staying in the chafing situation at school as a result of the new interpretation of the draft ruling.

Still other men caught are those who need to leave for an occasional semester to earn enough money to continue their education. Others try to work and study simultaneously, and thereby fall afoul of the “full-time” regulation. Sometimes merely transferring from one school to another can be dangerous, as in the case of a sophomore engineering student at the University of Michigan described in a *New York Times*’ article: “[Mike Batterson] transferred from a college which does not run on a trimester system like U.M.’s and he received only nine hours of credit for his freshman year. He is currently taking 15 hours of classes, but the total of 24 is six short of the 30 credits required by the draft as an average during each academic year to maintain the 2-S (student) status. ‘I could make up the six credits by going to summer school,’ says Batterson, ‘but I planned to work because I need the money to come back to school in the fall . . .’”³³

Some idea of how many men are being caught by the new ruling can be surmised from the number in the I-S draft category—mostly men deferred only to the end of the school year—which, in April, 1966, had grown in a year from almost nothing to 22,900. And some men caught

³³ Mitchel Levitas, “2-S, Too Smart to Fight,” *The New York Times Magazine*, April 24, 1966.

by the "full-time" interpretation were not even allowed to finish out their school year.

General Hershey might try to alleviate this problem with another regulation. But how can he be sure it would not merely open up new problems elsewhere?

Chapter 5

The Clogged Pipeline

In some ways more entangled than even the deferment system with all its inequities, is the control of the 1-A pool: i.e., the men considered liable for call-up at any time, from whose number comes the draftee.

Unhappily, it cannot be said that the Selective Service System knows fully what is going on in this pool. It does not know how many men are really available to be inducted or how many will be available next month, or how many are really needed by the Army (the only service that usually takes draftees), and it does not know where the men are geographically.

This is a major indictment, but it can be supported by examining the Selective Service's figures. In February, 1966, General Hershey appeared before the Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor. Committee members were not at all satisfied that the general had explained just how the draft was working

and why it was necessary for students to be threatened with induction. In response to a request from Representative Ogden Reid (R-New York), General Hershey sent the subcommittee a projected estimate of the draft's situation during the first half of 1966. This contained arithmetic errors which left 100,000 men unaccounted for; it was returned. In the second version the Selective Service claimed that given the 1-A pool at the end of January, and the number of new 19-year-olds being classified 1-A, and with expected draft calls of 40,000 men a month and enlistments of about 50,000 a month, the 1-A pool of "available" men would be exhausted and actually deficient of 5207 men on June 30, 1966. This alarming prediction convinced many that a draft of students was justified.

But it was not accurate. Monthly draft calls did not reach 40,000 during the whole spring, nor, for that matter, until October. February was 29,400; March 22,400; April 21,700; May 34,600; June 18,500. In short, the Selective Service overestimated its needs by more than a third during the period. Indeed, the February, March and April quotas were already known to Hershey when the projections were made.

The estimate of enlistments may have been more accurate, but the assertion that they represented a drain on the 1-A pool was not. According to the Department of Defense, nearly half of new enlistments (45 percent in 1965) come from men under 19, men who are not yet in the 1-A pool and who because of their enlistment, never will be. Another part of the 5,000 is drawn from men also outside the 1-A pool at the time of their enlistment: deferred students, for instance.

Finally, the Selective Service's estimates neglected to take into account the new manpower acquired by its own

reclassification of some 1-Y's (those with temporary mental and physical deferments) or those new men gained by the Army's lowering its mental standards (see Chapter 3).

Consequently, perhaps much to the surprise of draft officials, there was no manpower crisis at the end of June. No one knows how many young men on the draft's borderline were reclassified during that period and called up by local boards anxiously anticipating an imminent shortage.

How can the draft make such mistakes?

Early in 1966, the author attempted to find out, following up a public remark of General Hershey's³⁴ which described a clogged "pipeline" of paperwork in the draft bureaucracy. Some men's reclassification and induction papers were—and are—handled more efficiently than others. The ones whose papers were delayed or stalled are said to be in the "pipeline," and while it is likely that some inefficiency must arise in any system, in January, General Hershey said some 500,000 men out of less than 650,000 in the whole 1-A pool were in the pipeline.

According to a source at the Labor Department's Office of Manpower, Automation and Training, the problem has been growing since 1957, when only about 20,000 men were in the pipeline.³⁵ By 1966 General Hershey could declare, "I've never been in a time where the situation was more confusing than it is now, in terms of having numbers of registrants I could really count."³⁶

Here is what appears to be happening. When a man turns 18 he must register for the draft. If by age 19 he does

³⁴ *U.S. News*, *op. cit.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Much of this information, since corroborated by the Wednesday Group of Congressional Republicans, is from my article, "Draft Now Hits Men Long Thought Safe," in the *New York Herald Tribune*, January 23, 1966.

not obtain a deferment he is classified 1-A and is subject to induction. There presently are some 150,000 men turning 19 each month, of whom about 30,000 will be classified 1-A, while the others are either temporarily or permanently deferred. Other men come into the 1-A pool when they lose their II-S student deferment upon graduation or for some other reason.³⁷

Within the 1-A pool, however, there are priorities for drafting. Thus, all the single men aged 19 to 26, oldest first, are supposed to be called before the married men, who also are called oldest first. Therefore when a man is called up, supposedly all the other men of greater priority have already been drafted. But if in the process of being inducted, some men higher up had their papers delayed, they are "not available" to meet a particular month's call and, therefore, someone further down on the lists—maybe a married man or a student who has to be reclassified for the purpose—is called instead.

In January, 1966, 522,472 out of 641,958 men in the 1-A pool were "not available" to meet monthly quotas. "If we could get that figure whittled down," admitted one draft official in Washington, "things would improve greatly."

With local draft boards directed by the Selective Service System and with the "entrance and examination"—or "induction"—centers directed by the Department of Defense, it is not easy to trace the vagaries of the "pipeline."³⁸ The Selective Service System tends to blame the jam-up on the Pentagon, and a spokesman for the Army (which has

³⁷ Anyone classified or reclassified 1-A, of course, has the right to appeal that classification.

³⁸ Now it is even more difficult, for after the exposure of the January pipeline, the embarrassed Selective Service System abandoned the use of the description "not available."

charge of the induction centers) refers to it as "more of an internal problem of the Selective Service." There is reason to think it is both.

When a man takes his mental and physical test, the Army is required to return the results, in two sets, to the registrant's local draft board within five days.

The efficiency of the induction centers in processing the men is a fit subject for debate. An Army survey late in 1965 showed the five-day processing going smoothly, with a national backlog of only 6000 men's papers at any one time. But the Selective Service figures at the beginning of the new year showed 114,062 men whose *first* set of test results had not been returned to local boards and another 63,510 whose *second* set had not been returned. Both sets must be in the draft board's hands before a man can be ordered to report for induction.

Some men, as a result of the delays, are never drafted at all. A young man in New York who was graduated from law school in June at age 25 was reclassified then, but was not notified to report for an examination until December—on Christmas Eve, in fact. The examination was conducted on New Year's Eve. The young man passed his 26th birthday on the 14th of *February* and, telephoning his draft board, found they were still awaiting receipt of his second set of test results. "This is where the pipeline problem begins to develop," says a Selective Service official, anxious to stay anonymous while criticizing the Army. "I understand there is a four-month backlog represented in those figures" (114,062 and 63,510). Since the Army runs the induction centers, however, the Selective Service System feels there is little it can do to speed things up.

At the end of June, the Department of Defense finally owned up, though indirectly, to the induction center de-

lays, now claiming that the previously unacknowledged backlog of incomplete cases had been reduced by 32 percent.³⁹ But even on the day the Pentagon statement was released, a Boston registrant the author later interviewed was personally prodding an Army induction center to locate and deliver to the Selective Service the results of a physical examination given in December, 1965, more than six months before.

The pipeline jam is even more severe outside the induction centers than within them. Among the 522,000 men "not available" in the January statistics were 225,452 who were ordered for mental and physical examinations but whose papers telling them just where and when to report were delayed, "shuffling back and forth between draft boards and induction centers," as one draft spokesman put in.

"Say a Bismarck, North Dakota, boy moves to New Orleans and then becomes eligible for the draft. The Bismarck draft board writes the New Orleans induction center to find out when they can take him for examinations." The correspondence may take weeks. "The board sets a date well in advance and notifies the registrant." Thus the pipeline even for getting to the induction center may involve a wait of months for some people—while others go right through.

The pipeline lags for other reasons. Some 82,937 men in January were ordered for induction but had to wait for room to open for them in an Army training camp. There must be a twenty-one-day wait, by law, so that draftees can straighten out personal affairs. But since the Army can

only take about 35,000 men per month, the pipeline bulge here is still remarkably large.

There also are always a few men awaiting hearings or decisions on appeals, and some "delinquents"—including young men ignorant of the requirement to register at 18 and a few genuine draft-dodgers—who make up the balance in the pipeline.

One close and interested observer of the draft process is the Labor Department's Office of Manpower, Automation and Training, which likes to keep track of large movements of people to gauge their effect upon the labor market. An official there told the author in early 1966 that he found the draft's manpower dilemma hard to understand. "So far as we can judge," he says, "there should be no problem meeting needs even with increased calls." He then succinctly summed up much of the pipeline problem—and the inequities it causes—by ascribing it to the inefficiency of the draft's national operations. "Their bookkeeping is not that exact. They don't feel secure unless they can see where the next million men are coming from."

³⁹ Statement of Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), before the House Armed Services Committee, June 30, 1966.

Chapter 6

Are You Lucky in Where You Live?

To keep the draft process close to the people, enormous discretionary authority is lodged in the local boards. Consequently:

- A 24-year-old Peace Corps trainee from Kansas, whose request for deferment has been rejected by his local board and who has learned from a source privy to the state board that he is considered "the number one draft target in the state," finds he is quickly deferred when he transfers his appeal to New York, where he is in training.

- Two pilots with Flying Tiger Airlines, carrying a good deal of military cargo, are given occupational deferments, while a third pilot from a different draft district, is inducted into the Army, though he has exactly the same job as the other two and even more experience. (When Congressman Richard S. Schweiker of Pennsylvania cited this example to General Hershey in the House hearings, the general commented that the man should have appealed. "In

this case actually," replied Schweiker tartly, "the appeal was denied.")

- A childless husband in Chicago discovers that a high percentage of young men in his area volunteer for the draft and that therefore he is unlikely to be drafted, though childless husbands were called up months ago in nearby suburbs.

- Men in the entire state of Texas are less likely to be drafted than men in the state of Michigan where Selective Service boards continuously "overdraft."

Such examples, all genuine, are the result of inefficiency in the Selective Service System and the lack of consistent and well-defined national policy guidelines. Mr. Harold Wool, Director for Manpower Procurement Policy in the Pentagon, laconically observes, "The unevenness of the system creates spot sacrifices. It's the price for decentralization."

But it is a very high price indeed for the man making the sacrifice. The wide latitude of action left the local boards may be an expression of grass roots democracy, but its results are products of grass roots bumbling, prejudice and confusion derived from the permissiveness of the national headquarters.

Members of local draft boards are usually very patriotic citizens who serve without pay or much thanks. They tend to include a high percentage of retired or semiretired people, and members frequently serve twenty or twenty-five years. But they are strongly influenced by the paid female clerks who handle the board's daily affairs, who often become known for their testiness—as General Hershey has conceded—and who in some instances really decide who will be drafted and who will not.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ A young man in a Washington State city reports that when

The law empowers the local boards "to hear and determine, subject to the right of appeal, all questions or claims with respect to inclusion for, or exemption or deferment from, training and service . . . of all individuals within the jurisdiction of such local boards." They are guided by that law, by generally loose regulations from national headquarters, by the advice carried as news items in the Selective Service bulletins, and by the number of men required by the monthly quota.

Such lack of close oversight opens possibilities for a wide range of operative policies. Indeed, the local board can even influence how many people from its area are inducted. First, it has control over the number of men who are examined and "available" within the 1-A pool, and it is on the basis of this figure that the state board allocates the monthly draft call quota among the various local boards. Some boards are slower or less efficient in examining men in their 1-A pool and hence have fewer "available," and thereby receive a lower quota—a clear case of sloth rewarded.

Second, a board can control the size of the 1-A pool by its attitude toward deferments. A board may decide, for example, to be generous or strict with students. Since the results of the College Qualification Test and the class standings are only furnished as *advisory* criteria, the information is not at all binding on the local boards. It is almost entirely up to the prevailing local opinion as to how well a student should do on the tests in order to be deferred, and

he went to his board to try to find out what options were available to him as a registrant, the busy—and short-tempered clerk—heard just one sentence and then snidely handed him a magazine reprint, "How to Beat the Draft." "Here," she said, "I think this is what you want."

General Hershey has admitted that it is quite possible a student scoring in the 90th percentile would be drafted in one locality while a student scoring in the 60th percentile would be deferred in another locality. As has been mentioned before, standards of what is a "full-time" student also vary from place to place. If a local board, in short, is liberal with student and other deferments it will have fewer men in its 1-A pool, hence fewer "available" for induction and hence a lower draft quota.

In addition, quite apart from the board's own attitudes, a district 1-A pool will be profoundly influenced by the percentage of young men in the area who help meet the quota by volunteering for the draft, and in allotting quotas state and national headquarters also consider the number of men from the area who volunteer for the regular services. The size of these two groups reflects local economic and social conditions which differ greatly from state to state and even from town to town.

A local board also has power within the guidelines it is given to determine who, in its jurisdiction, as individuals and as categories, will be drafted *first*, a matter of priorities which can result in an effective exemption for someone postponed long enough. Local autonomy means that each man's standing with the draft will be reviewed by people with an understanding of local problems and concerns. But it also can mean that in one area students with their II-S deferments will be considered for reclassification before the I-Y's who scored low on the Armed Forces Qualification Test at the induction centers, or vice versa. The boards have authorization to consider reclassifying both or either, and it inevitably depends in part on the local preference: smart young men or the not-so-smart.

Thus, because of so much decentralization the *effective*

rules governing the draft shift their emphasis almost from town to town.

They also shift from state to state, and on this level one can really see the unplanned geographical discrimination of the draft in its full statistical measure. Though American youth are not so different in health and intelligence across the country, the 1965 Annual Report of the Director of the Selective Service reveals that IV-F deferment rates vary wildly from state to state. But, to make the point more concrete, just consider the different IV-F rates among these states with quite similar educational systems and sociological makeup: Michigan, 1.7 percent; Illinois, 2.8 percent; Ohio, 5.2 percent; Pennsylvania, 5.8 percent, and Massachusetts, 8.9 percent. Does anyone believe that the youth of Massachusetts are more than five times as likely as the youth of Michigan to be of low intelligence and poor health? The explanation simply must lie in different interpretations of the regulations by draft boards and induction centers.

Even more egregious are the variations in draft call quotas from state to state. Just as the local board can influence how many of its registrants will be put in the 1-A pool and how many of the 1-A pool will be examined and made "available," so the state board represents the composite situation of its constituent districts.

The state quotas are allocated on the following basis:

Upon receipt of each monthly requisition from the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Selective Service apportions it equitably among all the States. He then places a call for the required number of inductees upon each State through the State Director of Selective Service. Allocation of these calls is made generally in proportion to the registrants of the age group currently being selected who are

classified as available for military service in each State, some other factors are also considered. [sic] Among these are credits, consisting of the number of a State's residents currently reported as being on active duty with the Armed Forces.⁴¹

So the number of men in a state's draft call quota, like the local board's, is determined mainly by the number of men in its 1-A pool who are examined and qualified as "available." In practice that means that states whose boards have liberal attitudes toward deferments or whose boards are inefficient in processing paperwork through the "pipeline" will have a lighter burden than the tougher and more efficient states. That the discrepancy in efficiency among the states is significant is made evident in the following table.

From the table it is clear that application to these figures of the current formula for allocation of state draft calls would penalize Delaware, Indiana and Rhode Island for efficiency and would result in proportionately smaller calls for the relatively inefficient states.

In some cases state boards are so tough (or, if you will, so efficient) that they actually overdraft, while others underdraft.

The best illustration of these various discriminatory practices is a case study of Texas and Michigan.

Both Texas and Michigan are large, variegated states; Texas ranks fifth in population with 10,500,000 people (5.4 percent of the nation) and Michigan ranks seventh with 8,250,000 people (4.2 percent of the nation). The percentage of young males in the population of each state

⁴¹ Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1965, *op. cit.*

THE EFFICIENCY OF STATE BOARDS*

STATE	EARLY-CALL I-A POOL †		
	% Examined and qualified	% Not examined	% Not available for induction or examination
Arizona	10	43	47
Delaware	41	22	37
Indiana	56	20	24
Kentucky	20	48	32
North Carolina	14	31	55
North Dakota	29	38	33
Rhode Island	46	11	43
Washington	11	46	43

* Based on statistics in the 1965 Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service. The particular states were chosen because the over-all percentages of registrants in all of the early-call I-A categories were almost identical.

† As of June 30, 1965.

SOURCE: From the May, 1966, report of the Wednesday Group of House Republicans.

is identical; the total percentage registered with the draft is the same; the percentage of registrants in the 1-A pool is the same, and the percentage of each state's young men serving on active duty with the Armed Forces is the same.

By all indices, then, the draft calls for Texas should be 5.4 percent of the national calls and Michigan's should be 4.2 percent of the total.

But in fact, Texas' calls have been considerably below what they should have been and the draft calls for Michigan have been well over what they should have been. The effect has been so great that Michigan, the smaller state, has actually been drafting more men than has Texas. In fiscal 1965 the total Texas calls numbered 3881 whereas for Michigan they were 4093. In fiscal 1966 the pattern

continued unabated; the July draft call, for example, apportioned 1746 to Michigan and 1381 to Texas.⁴²

Michigan undoubtedly has very efficient draft boards and very tough ones. She inducts many and defers few, with rapid turnover in the 1-A pool. Her IV-F deferment rate is the lowest in the country, and in fact only 21 percent as high as the average. The national headquarters of the Selective Service responds to these conditions by giving Michigan an unduly large draft call each month. And, incredibly enough, Michigan often surpasses its quota by drafting more young men than are called for, an average of 14 percent overdraft since the current system was revived in 1948.

Obviously the Michigan Selective Service—which also has been in the forefront in revoking the deferments of student protesters against the draft—is one of the most patriotic anywhere and appears eager to sacrifice her young men unsparingly, whether they appreciate it or not.

⁴² The Texas-Michigan comparison was researched by the Wednesday Group, who presented their report in May. In replying to that report's charges, the Selective Service noted that part of its formula for allotting quotas is the relative number of men already in service in the respective states. This is a questionable practice in any case, since any given individual's draft status is to that extent determined not by his own situation or national needs, but by the decisions of other young men in his area. However, even if regular enlistment figures are properly an ingredient in the determination of draft quotas—and to what degree they are the Selective Service will not reveal—they are admittedly imprecise and three months or more old at any given time. But most significantly, in the Texas and Michigan case, the difference in the percentage of men "in service" in mid-1966 was very slight, 6.8 percent for Texas to 6.2 percent for Michigan. No possible rational formula using such facts could result in the smaller state of Michigan drafting over 20 percent more men than Texas. As the July statistic shows, the discrimination has continued even after the Wednesday Group's report.

Such heroism beyond the call of duty is not the lot of the Texas Selective Service, which has been underdrafting in ways that are the opposite of Michigan's. Together, the two states, whose situations are echoed to lesser degrees elsewhere, come as close as anything to demonstrating the draft's capricious, pervasive inequity.

PART II

One Frying Pan, Several Fires

Chapter 7

The Draft Lobby

The hoax of universality in the present draft system and the stupendous inefficiency deriving from its structure and its operations have been exposed to increasing attention. Defenders of the draft clearly have been caught off guard. The Vietnam war has necessitated the draft's reaching deeper into its 1-A pool and, as it were, lowering the level of some of its deferment dams; thereby more people than at any time since the Korean War are directly affected by the Selective Service System's operations. The "invisible young" described in Chapter 1 are now more immediately and even more numerous threatened with induction. Draftees also stand a better chance of being sent to Vietnam than regulars, since only 12 percent of the Armed Forces are draftees,⁴³ while 33 percent of the men in Viet-

⁴³ Robert Bunn, *Christian Science Monitor*, June 1, 1966. As of late spring, 1966, draftees accounted for 352,000 of the 3,093,000 members of the Armed Forces.

nam are draftees.⁴⁴ Consequently, parents and other adults who have tended to shrug off the draft as a necessary annoyance are now becoming alarmed that some men are being taken from civilian life and involuntarily assigned to combat in a system inherently inequitable. The war, which is only tangentially relevant to the draft imbroglio, has made possible the development of the draft as a public issue.

Ironically, the war may also be the most effective instrument for suppressing or at least stalling consideration of draft reform. The argument is made that to debate about the draft now will falsely encourage the Communists in Vietnam and falsely raise the hopes of young men faced with the draft here at home. It is true that whenever news has circulated that the draft might be abolished or replaced, enlistments seem to drop.

But the use of the Vietnam war to inhibit debate on the draft was fortuitously deterred by Secretary McNamara himself in a speech in Montreal, Canada,⁴⁵ when he scored the lack of universality in the draft as inequitable and suggested a program of national service, and by the President when in July, 1966, he appointed a commission to study draft operations and in August described the draft's rules as a "crazy quilt."⁴⁶

The McNamara proposal and the Presidential commission could not have brought much solace to General Hershey. He is disposed to avoid investigations and shun changes not emanating from the Selective Service headquarters itself, and really, to avoid any innovation at all. In 1955, Hershey commented: "There are many things

⁴⁴ Department of Defense, Public Affairs, June 8, 1966.

⁴⁵ *The New York Times*, May 19, 1966. The speech was to the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

⁴⁶ U.P.I., August 18, 1966.

that we would like to change in our present law. There are many things we would like to change in its operation. The question is whether, if you start changing them, you may not open up many other problems, and if we are going to have a democracy everybody must have their chance for a change. What the thing is going to look like when we get through many times impels us to go ahead with the evils that we face, so we live in some sort of accommodation with them rather than to jump into those we cannot foretell because, smart as we think we are, we haven't been able to forecast the future so that we could be 100 percent accurate . . ." ⁴⁷

One would think that such a reactionary attitude would have sent Congress into spasms of indignation. Imagine the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Labor admitting in public that changes in our foreign policy or labor laws might be needed but should be ignored lest one reform lead to another.

Perhaps because the draft was such a roiling political issue in 1940, it has been sacrosanct since. General Hershey and a number of politicians are all eager to keep the quadrennial question of draft extension falling on an odd-numbered year, since the general believes it makes less difference for how long the draft is extended than when the extension expires. He said of the 1955 bill, "[Let us] hope, pray or what not that the thing expires on a year that is not divisible by two. There are several reasons that I need not explain to you why this is so." ⁴⁸ The years "divisible by two" are election years, of course, and Hershey fears the influence of an aroused public.

⁴⁷ Quoted by Raymond F. Howe, editor, *Proceedings, Conference on Military Manpower*, American Council on Education, Washington, D.C., 1955, p. 19.

⁴⁸ Howe, *op. cit.*

Whenever the draft extension has come up for review since 1951 there have been demands from a handful of Congressmen that it be extended for only one or two years and a complete examination made during that time of the whole draft situation. The *Congressional Record* shows that each time, some of the critics have been persuaded and others simply overwhelmed by spokesmen for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, who argue that four years is needed to give the Congress the time it needs to really investigate the problems with the draft and to devise new legislation. In 1963, Representative Robert Kastenmeier of Wisconsin pointed out this pattern during House debate, but was himself apparently persuaded, for he joined reluctantly in voting the extension. The House vote that year was 373 to 3;⁴⁹ in the Senate the bill passed unanimously after ten minutes of debate.

Later, when criticism arises, Senate and House Armed Services Committees refer newsmen to the Selective Service System. And General Hershey modestly declares that he only administers the laws; if Congress wants to change them, that's their business. And soon critics are being told that the draft will come up for extension again in another year or two and then the whole matter can be looked into.

A variation of the draft lobby's runaround technique is evidenced in the behavior of the House Armed Services Committee and its chairman, Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina. When criticism of the pipeline and other aspects of the draft mounted in late 1965 and early 1966, Rivers told inquirers that his committee would begin hearings on the draft within a month. The first public

⁴⁹ Only Representative H. R. Gross (R-Iowa), Representative Peter Abele (R-Ohio) and Representative George Brown, Jr. (D-California) voted against extension on the final House vote.

statements of such a pledge were in early January and were made repeatedly after that until, finally, brief hearings were held in late June. But then they were limited to testimony from General Hershey, a Defense Department spokesman and several interested Congressmen. Chairman Rivers set the tone at the outset by declaring that while conscription might be "inimicable [sic] to our basic concept of individual freedom, we as a nation recognize that the alternatives can only result in jeopardizing our national security and in turn, our precious heritage of freedom."⁵⁰ Having thereby opened and closed in the same breath the most important question of the hearings, Rivers not surprisingly was as markedly uninterested in exploring the efficiency of the draft as a manpower procurement system as he is markedly uninterested in permitting other committees of Congress—such as Labor and Education—to hold hearings on the subject. Rivers in the past has been a supporter of higher military pay, but not primarily as a way of reducing the need for a draft, for he clearly isn't persuaded of any connection, and regrettably his committee, like its Senate counterpart, does not want a wide-ranging investigation.

A somewhat different version of the stall against major draft reform can be seen in the attitude of the White House from 1964 to 1966. President Johnson has said as little as possible on the subject, and whatever his motivations, his actions have seemed more to anticipate and quiet the draft's critics than to spur reform.

Adlai Stevenson was the first major politician after the war to call for abolition of the draft, a 1956 Presidential campaign stand that was roundly attacked as irre-

⁵⁰ Statement of Representative L. Mendel Rivers, June 22, 1966.

men . . . because if Army recruiting figures showed how easy it is for the Army to meet its force levels through voluntary enlistments, Congress would review the necessity of the draft.”⁵¹ What was needed, Curtis asserted, was to call a number of recruiting sergeants to testify under oath about this alleged practice, and *that* the Department of Defense was unlikely to do. Nor was it likely to examine the implications of the “evasion mentality” caused by the draft or the socio-economic effects of “channeling” men into jobs and other situations approved by the draft authorities. In short, Curtis expected a whitewash.

But Congress as a whole felt that it was best to let the President have his way. In 1959, under a Republican President, Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana), the future Majority Leader, argued vehemently against a Presidential commission on the draft, saying, “It is about time that we got away from attempting to meet every problem by the appointment of a commission.” And Senator Richard B. Russell (D-Georgia), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, caustically observed that “Usually we end by getting the same recommendations from the commissions that we have had from the Department of Defense on the same subject. It is really a new way of asking for the views of the Department of Defense.”⁵² Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas apparently agreed, and helped defeat the commission proposal in the Senate. By 1964, President Johnson felt differently about Presidential commissions, and so did Senators Mansfield and Russell.

A number of Congressmen, however, principally Republicans, were skeptical of the much-touted Defense De-

partment study. Curtis read into the *Record* a newspaper column by John McClaughry describing the Johnson device as a “phantom committee” which “in practice . . . does little or nothing. Its main purpose is to quiet the demands of Congress by assuring the public that something is being done.”

In the spring of 1965, when the study was due to appear, the only evidence of it was a calculated leak to the press that abandoning conscription would be too costly to consider. Inquirers in June, 1965, were told that the study was on the desk of Secretary McNamara awaiting transmittal to the President. Summer passed, and fall, and winter. By June, 1966, a year after the completion date, the study had yet to be released, and its contents were still a secret even to General Hershey.

When Representative Rivers held his hearing in the summer of 1966, a statement by Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, was billed as an unveiling of the Pentagon report. But, though the Rivers committee seemed adequately satisfied with it, the statement was nothing more than a report on a report, touching on only a few of the charges leveled against the system, and giving no evidence that the Department of Defense had attempted a definitive study.

The 22½-page, wide-margined, double-spaced Pentagon paper gave away its bias early by describing the growing supply of new manpower in America as “A principal problem affecting the operation of the draft system,” as if abundance were a “problem” and not an opportunity. It noted that the percentage of men age 26 (the effective final date of draft vulnerability) with military service had dropped from 70 percent in 1958 to 46 percent in 1966 and would drop to 42 percent in 1974 if the present size of

⁵¹ Representative Thomas B. Curtis, *Congressional Record*, June 25, 1964.

⁵² *Congressional Record*, March 11, 1959.

the military was maintained and to only 34 percent if it was restored to the levels that preceded the Vietnam build-up.⁵³

Nonetheless, the Pentagon said it had concluded that the draft was an essential influence toward supplying the military with adequate manpower. "To document this influence," said Mr. Morris, once again in his language exposing the fact that the Pentagon had decided its conclusions before it began its investigations, "a questionnaire survey was made of a representative sample (of military personnel) to determine the extent to which the draft influenced their decision to enter military service." That "survey" concluded, on the basis of one simple question, "Would you have entered service if there had been no draft?," that only 41 percent of regular officers and 38 percent of enlistees would join without the pressure of the draft. Apparently no deeper probing of motivation than that was attempted; the Pentagon paper did not explain, for example, why its survey made no distinction between men who said they would not have joined if there were no draft and those who said the draft was only one of several influences for enlistment. The Army, which has the hardest time getting enlistees of any branch, issued a study conducted only two years before the Pentagon study of 1964-66, which produced quite different results, based on a more detailed survey (see table).

The Army study is clearly more thorough and convincing than that released by the Pentagon. But the Pentagon apparently ignored the Army study and thus came to the pessimistic conclusion that without the draft the military could not maintain its force levels.

⁵³ Statement of Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), June 30, 1966.

INFLUENCE OF DRAFT UPON ENLISTMENT DECISION
OF FIRST-TERM ARMY ENLISTEES, BY MENTAL GROUP

	Total %	Group I %	Group II %	Group III %	Group IV %
No influence	46.8	21.7	35.2	55.9	66.9
Very little influence	16.5	14.0	18.0	16.3	14.6
Some influence	17.4	24.5	23.2	13.9	8.1
Very much influence	19.3	39.8	23.6	13.9	10.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: 5-percent Army-wide sample survey, as of November 3, 1962.

Based on responses to following question: When you were a civilian without prior military service, how much influence did the Selective Service draft have upon your decision to enlist in the Regular Army?

No influence; I wanted to be in the Army.

Very little influence; I most likely would have enlisted if there had been no draft.

Some influence; I might not have enlisted if there had been no draft.

Very much influence; I would not have enlisted if there had been no draft.

Moving on to deal with the question of whether increased pay would provide the necessary additional recruits for an all-volunteer military, the Pentagon reported on a survey that asked boys 16 to 19 whether pay alone would induce them to join the military if there were no draft. The findings were ("surprisingly") that "equal pay with civilian life was considered the most important inducement by less than 4 percent." But pay alone is not the "most important inducement" in almost any career, especially in the minds of 16- to 19-year-olds; and if it were, many would not admit it. Nonetheless, good wages cer-

tainly are *an* important—an essentially important—inducement to almost anyone. The higher reenlistment rate of Negroes, who tend to come from poorer circumstances than whites, shows the importance of monetary rewards in the military (see Chapter 9). Here again, the Pentagon study's probing of motivation was simplistic, if not simple-minded.

And the final estimates of how much pay scales would have to be increased to provide an all-volunteer military not only differed by billions of dollars from the estimate leaked to the press the previous year and with those of Secretary McNamara himself (see Chapter 11) but were so wildly divergent—"from 110 percent to 280 percent"—and the total increase in funds likewise—"six billion dollars to 17 billion dollars"—as to indicate that only the most generalized speculation was responsible for them. Indeed, so preposterous is the seventeen-billion-dollar estimate that if implemented it would mean a \$6300 *average raise* for every person in the military, and it presumably does not take into account the substantial savings from drastically reduced manpower turnover. If the figures did take such savings into account, they are even more outrageous, since the average pay raise implied in them would be higher still. It is useful for perspective to note that the median personal income for employed males in the United States is \$5431 (1963 Census sample), much less than the average pay *raise* implied in the Pentagon scale figures.

The fears of a whitewash expressed by Representative Curtis and other critics were fully realized in the Pentagon's statement. Extensive surveys and reams of "raw statistics" were alluded to, but not presented; one could not tell whether they really existed or not. And the all-impor-

tant matter of just what prejudices and assumptions were programmed into the Pentagon's computers on this study along with those statistics was anything but clear.

What was clear was that the Department of Defense effort was going to placate only the most tepid draft critics. But no sooner had it been unveiled than once again President Johnson attempted to head off the attackers by announcing a blue-ribbon Presidential "National Advisory Commission on Selective Service," another *deus ex machina*, or if you will, another *machina ex deo*, this time operated by Burke Marshall, a former Assistant Attorney General.

While this commission was given a supposed full mandate, true friends of draft reform must be forgiven for their skepticism. For one thing, the commission will operate for only five months (until January 1, 1967), and Presidential commissions have a way of meeting only occasionally anyway, calling important and busy people to Washington for brief deliberations on the work that the commission staff has undertaken.* While outside authorities are consulted, their opinions are weighed entirely in private and the public has no way of knowing what is going on or not going on. What's more, since most members of such commissions on complex issues—however well-intentioned they are—are handicapped by their relative lack of familiarity with the operations of the governmental departments affected by their study, they tend to be overly deferential to the spokesmen for those departments. There is little likelihood, for example, that the Presidential commission on the

* An inquiry by the author in mid-October revealed that members had met only twice in the first three and a half months of the Commission's existence.

draft will seriously challenge the validity of the Department of Defense's manpower statistics, for most potential doubters will founder on their own lack of expertise, the commission's relative lack of resources and the critical, debilitating lack of time.

In short, it would be pleasantly surprising indeed if the latest Presidential study of the draft yields anything more significant or persuasive than the former, or if the draft lobby will be much upset by its conclusions.

But perhaps the draft critics, at last, have caught on. When the commission was announced after the Johnson Pentagon study, Representative Curtis was only the most vehement in his denunciation of the conveniently timed action. Said *The New York Times* editorially, "If Mr. Johnson thinks it desirable to call for a fresh study after finding the Pentagon's work disappointing, Congress appears justified in a study of its own. After all, it has no assurance that the next Presidential study will be any better than the last." ⁵⁴

Democrats such as Senator Nelson of Wisconsin and Representatives Kastenmeier and Reuss, also of Wisconsin, and Republicans such as Wednesday Group-members Morse of Massachusetts, Bell of California and Reid of New York are demanding a real investigation of the draft and its possible alternatives. Most believe a joint special committee of Congress, made up of members of Armed Services, Education and Labor, Appropriations and other affected committees, should conduct the investigation in full view of the public and with ample resources and time to do the job right.

A true investigation will let the facts speak without prejudice, and will call on representatives of the entire

⁵⁴ *The New York Times*, July 5, 1966.

community of interests in any way affected by the draft—the universities, the poverty program, the churches, psychologists, labor and manpower experts, State Department personnel, economists, civil rights organizations, and most important, some of the nation's young men in uniform and some of those not in uniform. And the Pentagon and the Selective Service and the rest of the draft lobby will have the fullest chance to present their case from every possible angle. The only thing they will not have is the right to control the investigation.

Chapter 8

The Draft as Society's Benefactor

The draft is probably host to more mistaken rationales than any piece of current legislation, most of them sprung unchallenged out of the World War II experience, that so colors the thinking of many politicians and military men alike. For some in the draft lobby, conscription is really seen not as a necessary evil but as a positive benefit to society, perhaps worth maintaining even if the Chinese and Soviets were to metamorphose into capitalist democrats in the morning.

The gist of one myth is that the draft is a great leveler, a unique medium through which the rich and the poor, the black and the white, the Yankee and the Southerner, the Irishman and the Jew, the bright and the stupid all get together in the greatest of melting pots, the Armed Forces. There they have the unique opportunity to learn how the various other halves live; there they learn camaraderie and brotherhood. And finally, it is suggested that today's

youngsters know less about these things than even their parents because of the ghettoization of American life—the all-white middle class suburbs and the all-poor and Negro slums.

Perhaps the draft served a homogenizing function in society in World Wars I and II, and perhaps it retains that effect in some small degree today. But the quality of the experience is certainly to be doubted. Many people actually acquire prejudices in the service, particularly in the lower ranks familiar to the draftee. Moreover, the deferment policies, which make the Reserves attractive to college graduates, and the fact that most of the college-educated regulars serve as officers tend to limit that element in the homogenization process.

But more important, the young American of today is not more but less of a provincial than his World War II father or uncle, and less in need of homogenization than at any time in history. We are concerned about ghettoization—and properly—because we have solved enough of our other problems as a people that we can now afford to tackle this one. But the fact is that race relations—despite all the noise and even violence that has accompanied change in this arena, as it does in most—are much better now than in previous generations; unless, of course, we choose to see the old “yassuh-boss” Negro servility of other days, when there were many fewer demonstrations or riots, as a fading ideal.

The present generation does not need the draft to introduce it to other races and conditions of men; it is reaching out quite well on its own, through schools, civil rights organizations, anti-poverty and civic groups, and many other activities. Whatever its failures, mass culture also has been a homogenizing influence on the youth of today.

So has increased geographical mobility. So has the steady rise in education levels of youth. America's population has increased 26 percent in the fifteen years since 1951, while the draft-age population has increased 95 percent—creating the remarkable revolution in manpower possibilities discussed in Chapter 1. But even more remarkable, the number of college students since 1951 has increased 148 percent.⁵⁵ In the present decade of the 1960's alone, according to Census projections, the number of college students is *doubling*.⁵⁶ Scholarships have never been so plentiful; a great college like Harvard may have had only a handful of scholarship students in the good old days; today a full third of the students are on scholarships. These are mostly children of the poor and lower middle class, with more Negroes and other minority groups represented than ever before. And as a whole, as polls have shown increasingly,⁵⁷ the higher educated citizens evidence the most racial, religious and other tolerance and the most social concern in society.

Even among the non-college artisan class there is greater social mobility today than ever before, largely the fruit of higher income. There are more people traveling today than ever before, more integrated unions, more integrated businesses, not just with Negroes and whites, but all ethnic and regional groups. Increased urbanization has brought other new contacts. In short, are not all these forces more positive and dynamic—more to be encouraged and supplemented—than the draft?

⁵⁵ Wednesday Group papers, May, 1966.

⁵⁶ General Hershey has a fantasy in which he imagines that the "channeling" effect of the draft is responsible for this increase—though one supposes he claims credit only for the increase among men.

⁵⁷ Harris Poll, August, 1966.

Similarly, the myth that "the Army builds men," insofar as it relates to the draft, should also be debunked. Many old veterans cherish the memory of what benefits military discipline brought them, or usually, brought somebody else. Once again, however, it is doubtful that these benefits could not better be obtained privately or through such Government programs as the Job Corps. And, also, the young men most needing discipline—the graduates of street-corner gangs, the emotionally upset, the stupid—are just the people the physical, mental and moral tests of the draft keep out.

But even for those who are taken, it is questionable what good, on balance, military life is to the draftee. Most learning experiences of life are conscious-expanding; the draft merely inculcates in upward of 90 percent of its wards a desire to get out as soon as possible. The training that is acquired often will be useless to a man in his civilian career, for draftees are not the men on whom the military lavishes its famed training programs. Draftees learn chiefly to suffer boredom endlessly, to take orders, to feel responsibility only for a tight and small area of assignment, to take their pleasures on the run and where they can—all lessons that may have some use for them as soldiers, but few of which can be justified in terms of the civilian life nearly all the men will lead. Americanism Committees of the American Legion talk about "duty" and General Hershey talks about the citizen's "privilege of service" in the draft, but perhaps the youth who is actually facing it as a draftee and whose suspicions are confirmed by his contemporaries who have endured it can be excused for his cynicism. The inequitable draft system not only takes him arbitrarily, but misuses him, and then tells him he is lucky to have had the experience. And in so doing the

draft becomes itself the most egregious cheapener of the concepts of "duty" and the "privilege of service."

But is also said that the draft is of social value in maintaining the "citizen participation" in the military, and some even darkly suggest that the draft is our best assurance against undue military excursions against civilian authority, protecting liberty by precluding the possibility of a military "take-over."

There is something about such an argument that has a fashionable, democratic tone in the speech of a politician or between the covers of a weekly magazine. But from the perspective of any Army post it is the most palpable foolery, for if there is a military establishment, it is made up of career officers, not draftees. Draftees are the lowest caste of a caste-conscious estate and wield no influence whatever, and heaven help us if American liberty from undue military influence rests on their helpless shoulders.

Indeed, potentially, the draft is the ally, not the challenger, of authoritarianism, a potent threat to liberty, not its guarantor. The power to impose the "privilege of service" in the draft is intrinsically dangerous in a free society. Robert Taft, Sr., once said, "By handing boys over to the arbitrary and complete domination of the government, we put it in the power of the government to indoctrinate them with the political doctrines then popular with the government . . . In wartime it is bad enough; in peacetime it would be intolerable."⁵⁸

It is intolerable too when the draft is used in times of undeclared war such as now exists in Vietnam to stifle dissent even before induction. One need not agree with the views of the anti-war draft-card burners nor acquiesce in

⁵⁸ Cited by J. Stuart Innerst, House Hearings, March 1, 1963, p. 159.

disruption of draft board offices with sit-in protests to be gravely worried by the Selective Service System's attempt to punish the alleged lawbreakers with military service. Using the draft as a trial court and a prison hardly squares with the concept of "privilege of service," though General Hershey's view of the draft's "channeling" function is certainly thereby illuminated.

Hershey at the time of the early draft-card burnings and sit-ins complained that he was only acting to assure obedience of the Selective Service laws enacted by Congress. The protesters had violated the law, he said and those of them who were students had thereby deprived themselves of the right to deferments; they were to be reclassified and inducted. Fortunately, the Justice Department and outspoken libertarians such as Representative Emanuel Celler (D-New York) and Senator Philip Hart (D-Michigan) helped publicize the injustice and impropriety of the Selective Service's plan. A man is innocent in America until proven guilty, and he is to be proven guilty, if at all, in a court of law. General Hershey was judging the students to be lawbreakers on no authority but his inadequate own. Moreover, when a man is proven guilty in America he is correctly punished by law, not by some outside agency—particularly not an aggrieved one such as the Selective Service System. Only the intervention of Hart and others prevented a miscarriage of justice by the System and a still further cheapening of the sacrifices of those drafted.

Such incidents do not asperse the military or the military man's life. But they belie the defense of the draft as a socially beneficial institution. For the draft cannot be so defended: it performs no salutary social purpose whatever that is not counteracted by a greater social mischief; it inculcates no valuable social trait in one young man that is

not overshadowed by socially detrimental traits inspired in another; it offers no training of social or individual worth that could not be provided more successfully by private or Government programs outside the draft.

All that can be said for the present draft is that with all its faults it still is less harmful to society than would be *most* of the alternatives proposed to replace it.

Chapter 9

The Poverty Myth

The Selective Service System, with its deferments and priorities and tests, undoubtedly was the best available means of recruiting soldiers in the low manpower days of World War II and Korea. Times changed fairly quickly however (though one wouldn't guess it listening to the arguments of the draft's defenders) and the fraudulent banner of "Universal Military Training" under which the present system marches is symptomatic of the draft's obsolescence.

Unhappily, many of the most pronounced critics of the draft fail to recognize that its central fault, from which inefficiencies and inequities spring, is the declining necessity of any draft at all. Some reformers want to clear up the inequities with a draft that is consciously arbitrary. Others want to clear up the inequities by artificially restoring the universality which was never needed and has become a mockery today. The attitudes integrated into such plans are easily as dangerous as those suffusing the arguments

propounded by the Selective Service System's friends. A number of reformers have based their proposals on the validity of an emotional anti-draft claim first concocted by povertarians such as Michael Harrington, who are ever eager to sire new mutant strains of the basic line. These critics assert that the draft requires the disadvantaged in society to carry an unfair share of the national defense burden. Because the draft defers college students, they say, and because college students tend to be the wealthy, the white and, of course, the well-educated, the system relies on the poor, the Negro and the uneducated for draftees.

There may be some justification for such generalized correlations in analyses of the job market, housing or education, but they are at best very shoddy instruments for examining the workings of the draft. The prototypes of the correlations—the poor, uneducated Negro, on one hand, and the rich, well-educated white on the other—are relatively small groups within the total draft pool and not a majority within any category.

However, the povertarian myth can be exposed even using the correlations. Perhaps it was because so many photographs sent back by the press in Vietnam have shown Negroes in combat that the povertarians rashly concluded (a) there must be an unwarrantedly heavy draft of Negroes, and (b) more Negro draftees than whites were being sent to fight in Vietnam; that Vietnam is "a white man's war being fought by the black man."

Ironically, the photographs are in part a product of the reporters' attempts to show that Vietnam is not a "white man's war." In any case, most of the pictures are of regular units, which, after all, make up the bulk of the United States fighting force in Vietnam; and, within the regular (volunteer) forces, Negroes represent a larger share of the

total than their percentage of the population would indicate: 14 percent of the Army, for example, as opposed to 11.7 percent of the 18- to 26-year-old population generally.⁵⁹ This is because of the military's attraction to the Negro as a career field relatively free from racial discrimination, and to the poor and uneducated as a relatively orderly financial existence, and is demonstrated by the following table of comparative reenlistment rates of Negroes and whites in the regular forces:⁶⁰

REENLISTMENT RATES, MAJOR SERVICES

	Army %	Navy %	Air Force %	Marines %
Negroes	49.3	41.3	50.3	25.1
Whites	18.5	21.6	27.4	12.0

Povertarians seldom acknowledge *this* correlation, insisting that the reason for the high percentage of Negro fighters is a Selective Service overdraft among the disadvantaged. They point out that 16.3 percent of inductees are nonwhites, as opposed to the only 11 percent of the population that are nonwhite, primarily Negroes.⁶¹ Draft statistics, however, are very uncertain and often unreliable, changing considerably from month to month, especially, it appears, statistics regarding race. In May, 1966, the Selective Service reported that nonwhites made up only 13.4 percent of the draft calls at that time out of an 18- to 26-year-old Negro population—a more realistic sample than that of over-all population—of 11.7 percent. And in June,

⁵⁹ Cited by John Cashman, "The New Army," *New York Post*, March 1, 1966.

⁶⁰ Provided by the Selective Service System, May 31, 1966.

⁶¹ Cashman, *op. cit.* The figures are based on the 12-month period ending June 30, 1965.

1966, General Hershey told the House Armed Services Committee that the nonwhite induction rate was 10.4 percent, proportionately less than the white rate.⁶²

The povertarian argument against the draft overlooks the fact that Negroes, the poor and the uneducated are far less likely, because of environmental conditions, to meet the mental, physical or moral standards of the Armed Forces Qualification Test. For mental reasons alone, 28.3 percent of all men tested by the AFQT in 1964 were disqualified either into the IV-F and I-Y category.⁶³ Physical rejections accounted for 25.8 percent. As of May, 1966, some 2,500,000 men were classified IV-F and for practical purposes permanently exempted from the draft, and another 2,300,000 were classified I-Y, deferred until a national emergency. Some of the I-Y's are being reexamined for possible reclassification. But only 1,900,000 men were deferred as students, and their deferments are temporary indeed, justifiable only as long as the men are completing their education according to the "full-time normal progress" strictures of the Selective Service, and either are in the top fractions of their class or could pass the College Qualification Test with a high enough score to satisfy their draft boards. Dividing the 4,800,000 IV-F's and I-Y's by two—the rough breakdown between disqualification for mental and physical reasons—one sees that there are some half-million more men deferred from military service because of lack of intelligence than because of high intelligence.⁶⁴

⁶² Author's notes, Hearings of the House Armed Services Committee, June 22, 1966. Official printed testimony was not available at this writing; however, the author was permitted to read the stenographic transcript and compared his notes for accuracy with those of other observers.

⁶³ Walton, *op. cit.*, p. 81. The figure should be somewhat lower since standards were slightly reduced in November, 1965.

gence.⁶⁴ Again, it might be remembered that the deferment for intelligence is far more temporary and precarious than that for lack of intelligence. According to Selective Service statistics of June, 1966,⁶⁵ 56 percent of men who have attended college eventually see military service, while only 46 percent of non-college men serve. These percentages may vary in the future, as Selective Service System figures do, but their significance is clearly not a vindication of attacks upon the concept of a college deferment.⁶⁶

The povertarian argument against the draft also misses the fact that Negroes, the poor and the uneducated are most likely, because of their environmental conditioning, to marry earlier than their poverty correlation opposites and thereby are better candidates for a fatherhood deferment. Available samples of Census statistics reveal that Negro men marry an average of five months earlier than whites, that men with only nine to eleven years of schooling (high school dropouts) marry an average of a year and a half earlier than college graduates, and that men now earning \$3000 a year married on an average of seventeen months earlier than those who make \$10,000 a year.⁶⁷

So the "disadvantaged" do seem to have the advantage in escaping the draft. Undoubtedly there are many individual cases of men who have been mistreated by the draft because they were poor, or even Negro or uneducated, especially in some districts. Students who have to interrupt

⁶⁴ Described by the author in "Selective Service and National Needs," *The Reporter*, June 16, 1966.

⁶⁵ Author's notes, Hearings of the House Armed Services Committee, June 22, 1966.

⁶⁶ The McNamara "salvage" of 40,000 rejectees, some 30 percent of whom are expected to be Negroes, will make only a slight change in the overall ratios.

⁶⁷ Available Census estimates as of June, 1966.

their schooling to earn the money to continue later is a common example already cited. Yet these cases are a function of the general arbitrary, self-defeating and often callous operation of the draft, not the product of some inherent class exploitation. Representative Alvin O'Konski (R-Wisconsin) warned General Hershey in House Armed Services Committee hearings⁶⁸ that though "They say the poor are always with you . . . if the draft goes on as it has, they may not be with us much longer." But the examples of apparent discrimination against the poor cited by O'Konski are most likely a reflection of the local attitudes of draft boards in his area, and an indictment chiefly of the varying standards of the system nationally.

⁶⁸ Author's notes, Hearings of House Armed Services Committee, June 23, 1966.

Chapter 10

The Deficient Alternatives

Unfortunately, many of the critics attached to the poverty argument have helped cloud the whole discussion of the draft by proposing a lottery system like that abandoned with good reason early in World War II. A lottery would indeed preclude the errors and prejudices of human judgment, except, of course, as they operate in the original conceptualizing of the plan; for a lottery in some ways would be more arbitrary, more self-defeating and more callous than the present draft.

It would be more arbitrary, obviously, since it would make no distinctions of age, marital status, occupation or anything else. The complications and most of the contradictions of the present system would be avoided, but it is doubtful that injustice dealt by nonhuman hands would be any more tolerable in the minds of most people than that dealt by human hands, that the public would long support a plan that could easily take the future nuclear physicist

and leave the part-time store clerk, that could take the young father of three and leave the unemployed farmer. At least in World War I and during that part of World War II in which the lottery was used, there was a manpower shortage and the draft was mostly there to determine the order of service, not who would serve and who would not.

Lottery advocates have protested that men in certain critical jobs or in hardship cases would be permitted an exemption once their number was drawn under a lottery and that such exemptions were in fact granted under the lottery in the past. But such exemptions in World Wars I and II were few and the national interest was always interpreted on a short-term basis: what would help win the war? Today the nation is not in imminent military danger and determination of the national interest must be considered on a long-term basis, with deferments—for students, for instance—granted with that in mind. If wide deferments are established within a lottery system, then it really isn't a lottery anymore and the original purpose of the idea's proponents will have been defeated.

But the most damning moral criticism of a lottery system is that it would not come to grips with the new manpower facts of the nation and the military, that a smaller and smaller percentage of young men would be forced to sacrifice for the balance. Since pure chance, neither reasonable nor compassionate, would choose the draftee, the lottery would also be supremely callous, a dehumanizing, frivolous, Government-sponsored game of Russian roulette.

In many minds, the essential impracticality of a lottery form of selection is even more persuasive than the moral indictments. If men are drafted young, or selected young and given the right to decide when they will serve, there

will be no incentive for other men to volunteer for the regular forces or the Reserves. If a man were not selected, he would feel free to make other plans and the military would have a hard time drawing on him if manpower needs suddenly became great. On the other hand, if men were drafted out of the lottery late, the uncertainty now complained of would be even greater because of the absence of deferments. By the time many men were called they would have acquired families and careers, and separating them from either would be beneficial for neither the individual nor for the country.

A second prominent alternative to the present draft system would merely compound the inefficiency and deprivation of liberty by extending it. "National service" would be a draft writ larger, an attempt to conscript for society's alleged improvement those men—and women—not conscripted for society's defense.

The national service idea was born of many minds. One of the earliest progenitors was the distinguished philosopher William James, who urged in *The Moral Equivalent of War*, "a conscription of the whole youthful population to form a part of the Army enlisted against nature. The military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fiber of the people; no one would remain blind to man's relation to the globe he lives on."⁶⁹

The sociologist Margaret Mead reportedly called more recently for such a program during a conference with President Johnson two years ago. Other recent proponents include William Josephson, counsel to the Peace Corps, and Donald J. Eberly, a young man who helped organize

⁶⁹ William James, *The Moral Equivalent of War*, International Conciliation, Number 224, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Worcester, Mass., 1926.

an ad hoc "National Service Conference" of important educators and other interested parties in New York in 1966. One fast convert was Representative William F. Ryan (D-New York), while Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-New York), normally a man of uncommon good sense, was so eager he urged implementation without even further study.

But the most valued booster of the national service scheme, though he quickly attempted to "clarify" his endorsement out of existence after giving it, was Secretary of Defense McNamara. In a speech in Montreal on May 18, 1966, Mr. McNamara declared, "Our present Selective Service System draws on only a minority of eligible young men. That is an inequity. It seems to me that we could move toward remedying that inequity by asking every young person in the United States to give two years of service to his country—whether in one of the military services, in the Peace Corps or in some other volunteer developmental work at home or abroad."

The Peace Corps is always used as an example of alternative service that could be rendered in a national service program, yet the Peace Corps is a rather small program, which even at maximum expansion, according to its own spokesmen, would hardly grow to more than 40,000 men and women, only a part of them draft age. It probably is mentioned because for some time it has been a source of controversy in regard to the draft.

Peace Corps service these days is usually worth a draft deferment, but only for two years. If the Peace Corps volunteer hasn't passed his 26th birthday by then, he may be drafted. Some boards recognize the fact that Peace Corps life is as arduous and dangerous as that of the average soldier. If one is less likely to be killed intentionally, he is

more likely to die of disease, for many volunteers undergo hardships of poor food, shelter and medical attention not often experienced by soldiers, and certainly not by the four-fifths of the military's personnel who are in noncombat positions.

Yet many draft boards are suspicious of the Peace Corpsmen. Victims sometimes of the military mystique, boards fail to credit the contribution of Peace Corpsmen to the peace and stability of the world as being at least equal to that made by the ordinary soldier. No great cry has arisen on behalf of draft-threatened Peace Corpsmen for several reasons: they knew there was some risk in their joining the Peace Corps, they are not the complaining type in any case, and the Peace Corps administration itself feels too politically vulnerable to make a public stand for its volunteers.

Every person who has known Peace Corps volunteers and anyone who has seen them at work around the world, as has the author, appreciates their contribution and surely feels they should not be subjected to the draft as a reward for that contribution. A *deferment* might be in order. However, national service advocates extrapolate from the plight of the Peace Corps draftee, which after all is an uncommon case because of the small size of the Peace Corps, to create a scheme under which virtually any humanitarian work would constitute fulfillment of one's service obligation.

Approved projects might include the poverty program, foreign service or social work in hospitals, orphanages or prisons, highway clean-up campaigns or forestry work.

The national service plan obviously would have a radical impact on the life pattern of young Americans. It would put their reputed idealism and dedication to the full-

est test. The added manpower provided to approved projects could mean breakthroughs in social progress at home and abroad. The military draft would continue as one part of national service and it would be "equitable" because true universality would have been returned to the system.

But the idea that each citizen owes the state a certain number of years goes far beyond the constitutional authorization to "provide for the common defense" and abridges individual rights by requiring "involuntary servitude." William Josephson has written that national service would not really be compulsory, but that "National service would be expected of every citizen. Particular *assignments*, including military service assignments, would be made by the national service authority taking into account individual preferences, skills and experience and national need"⁷⁰ (emphasis added).

But what kind of service is it if not involuntary when one is "assigned" to a job, with only his preferences taken into account by the all-wise "national service authority"? It is hard to see the difference between such a forceful direction of man's labor and that of the Communist system, except, of course, that "national service" would last only two or three years—though possibly more, its proponents admit.

Furthermore, if defense is not the rationale for one's forced labor, who is to say what is "valuable" social work and what is not? The Government is almost sure to bless a great many worthless projects of its own, while precluding as satisfactory fulfillment of national service obligations work in private charities (where, after all, does one draw the line?), in church organizations, civil rights groups (if

⁷⁰ June 13, 1966, letter in response to author's article in *The Reporter*.

the N.A.A.C.P. is all right, how about S.N.C.C.?), or in political parties. Is the national service authority likely to credit as socially valuable the essentially private work of a poet, painter or musician, or does it know of some conservation camp or hospital in which they could contribute more to society?

These are the staggering philosophical obstacles to any national service plan, and the administrative problems are no less staggering. The plan, say its promoters, would encompass all young men and women who were not physically incapacitated, insane or criminal. Thus, nearly all of the 1.2 million men at any yearly rung of the draft-age ladder who were not in the military would be eligible (or 3.6 million for a three-year term of service) and so would the two million women in any year age group (six million over three years). Nearly 9.6 million young people not now in the military would be put to social jobs designed by the national service authority, much as the Work Projects Administration during the Depression invented jobs for a very much smaller number. Of course, we are not in a Depression today and the 9.6 million workers would come right out of the job market which already is experiencing a severe shortage of manpower.

And the cost of national service would not be limited to the loss of workers, and the careers delayed two or more years. The other workers in the economy, through taxes, would have to pay the salaries of the 9.6 million. Just how expensive the operation might become is a rather alarming thought when one considers that training costs alone for a single Peace Corps volunteer average \$7800.

The problems with national service never end. Where would jobs for so many people be found? Would national service take salary-earning young fathers with children

away from their families to do highway beautification or police work? Or take cripples? Or teachers? And if deferments are granted from national service the way they are granted from the draft, is the system likely to be less cumbersome and unjust? What about the people who presently make their living at the social work the "national servants" would do for little or nothing? And finally, is service really humanitarian when it is forced? Is the Peace Corpsman or poverty worker really effective when he is there only as a choice of several disagreeable (to him) alternatives to the Army? The military as a whole suffers from the bad reputation compulsion through the draft has given it, and national service would similarly taint every project of good works it touched.

Social work can be accomplished most efficiently through the intensified use of normal private and public instrumentalities, with professionals and especially with well-motivated volunteers who in the long run save everyone money and do the best job. Voluntarism, after all, has been an essential ingredient in our nation's greatness. It can and should be encouraged and further developed to meet expanding needs and opportunities; but it should not be prostituted. For the individuals whose efforts for mankind were drafted and for the nation to whose needs they were to minister, national service, as Harvard President Nathan M. Pusey puts it, "would be a colossal waste of time."⁷¹

Yet a great many people presently sympathetic to the draft system are also interested in greater exploration of the national service idea as a means of approaching an even less popular system, that of real universal military training. Such men as General Hershey, Representative

⁷¹ *The New York Times*, June 14, 1966.

Charles S. Gubser (R-California) and Representative Olin Teague (D-Texas) personally prefer the concept of military service for everyone. Gubser would like the Congress to consider instituting a service obligation in which a young man would have to earn at least 20 "points" through some initial military training (10 points) and either further military service or acceptable humanitarian work. Colonel Walton, in *The Wasted Generation*, sees in some combination of national service and Universal Military Training a means of aiding that 50 percent who fail the induction tests and who, he believes, are thereby shown to be social incompetents of various sorts (see Chapter 3). Most of them, under a combination of national service and U.M.T. would meet much of their obligation by "serving" in the Job Corps, by learning discipline and becoming "literate."⁷²

General Hershey himself is also eager to get the induction test failures into uniform by compulsory means. "Uplift of the citizenry" is what he is after and he thinks the military should handle it through some form of Universal Military Training if necessary. "I don't know of a better place for the unruly and the unfit than the armed services," he told a House Committee.⁷³ It would be a good place to teach patriotism to juvenile delinquents, for example. "You can't get more universal than I am," he proudly declared, and his friend, Representative Rivers, the committee chairman, concurred, saying he thought we should get back to what he considered World War II physical standards for induction, when "they didn't examine your eyes and arms, they counted them."⁷⁴

⁷² Walton, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-168.

⁷³ Author's notes, Hearings of the House Armed Services Committee, June 24, 1966.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

In 1964 General Hershey proposed the restoration of Universal Military Training, with all 1-A's in the draft pool serving ten weeks, including basic training.⁷⁵ Thereafter, the men would be given an opportunity to enlist in any branch of the services, and General Hershey estimated that of the 1.5 million (excluding the unfit) who were turning draft age then, 400,000 would volunteer to continue—enough to meet the needs of the military at that time. Everyone would have had a chance to be “uplifted” by basic training and enough men would learn of the military's career opportunities to satisfy the long-term military requirements. Since basic training costs the Government about \$1500 a man, the cost of Hershey's proposal (which of course was not accepted by the Pentagon) would have been over 2.2 billion dollars annually. Representative Olin Teague has proposed more or less the same program, with twelve weeks' service for every man, whereafter one would, however, be required to join one of the services, the Reserves, or continue to face the draft.

Universal Military Training, alone or attached to a national service scheme, would end draft “inequities” much as the “inequity” of beheading one thief for stealing bread and letting another go free could be ended by beheading both. But, while “equity” is served, common sense and human liberty are not. General Hershey has said, “We have gone hog-wild in this country on individual rights at the expense of group rights.”⁷⁶ Libertarians worrying over the modern spread of snooping devices, income tax investigations and an increasing myriad of governmental regulations, not to mention the draft itself (an infringement of

⁷⁵ Richard Fryklund, Washington, D.C., *Star*, December 8, 1964.

⁷⁶ Author's notes, Hearings of the House Armed Services Committee, June 24, 1966.

liberty Senator Arthur Vanderberg once called “repugnant to the spirit of democracy and the soul of republican institutions”⁷⁷), cannot help but feel that the Director of the Selective Service System has grossly misrepresented America today.

Let those who think some military training is good for all, that American youth are undisciplined, unaware of hygiene, ignorant and lacking in patriotism have a talk with a recent boot camp graduate. It was said before that the draft, on balance, performs no useful social function, and the same must be said even more strongly of basic training, that brief period of calculated and perhaps necessary unreason General Hershey thinks would inspire 400,000 men who went through it each year to immediately sign up for a volunteer military career. Basic training as it is practiced in most camps may have a military purpose—it turns out soldiers—but it cannot be said to teach the hygiene, morality, patriotism or other civic virtues which the U.M.T. proponents claim now as their central objective in widened service.

“Hygiene” in boot camp theoretically means learning to keep one's toiletries, clothes and barracks immaculately clean, but in practice it usually means perfectionist standards that are impossible under the circumstances, so nearly all trainees quickly learn not cleanliness but just the opposite, how to disguise oneself as clean. Thus, keeping the nozzle of one's toothpaste tube literally spotless is less difficult to achieve if one simply doesn't use it; the latrine crew can keep all the barracks' commodes flawlessly sparkling only if a jungle law is passed among the trainees that all but one toilet will be off-limits though that can mean forty men use one toilet. Keeping the barracks floor free of

⁷⁷ *Congressional Record*, August 12, 1940.

any speck of dust only can be achieved to the point of perfection by each man's frequently kneeling on all fours to "sweep" with his hands, the practical effect of which frequently is to bring down half or more of a platoon at a time with dust coughs and colds. Such practices may teach military discipline and even team spirit, but by no means do they teach hygiene.

Similarly, the dutifully posted Department of Defense admonitions against swearing, usually quoting from a speech by President George Washington, and compulsory attendance during early weeks of boot camp at the Catholic, Protestant or Jewish chapel "of your choice," theoretically teach morality, but in practice most training instructors' less-than-exemplary language and the sadly banal irrelevance of most military sermons certainly undercut any intended moral "uplift" during basic training.

As for patriotism learned from class E military propaganda films on the subject, the wearied recruits generally show their respect by using the time and the sequestering darkness to catch up on much needed sleep, and indeed sleeping during classes of all kinds is one of the military's greatest problems with basic training.

Men who have been through basic training in most areas of the modern American military know about this; so must Congress and General Hershey. And if they do not, they should find out. Boot camp is designed to make soldiers out of civilians; except by accident, and that rarely, it does not and cannot make better civilians of civilians. Any argument that it does is freighted with ignorance, quarter-truths or fraud, and any Universal Military Training program such as Hershey, Gubser and Teague have proposed, which anticipates inculcating other than purely military values, falls on the sword point of experience.

Fortunately much of the regular Armed Forces is opposed to U.M.T. on the grounds of its military impracticality, for, as Brigadier General Lynn D. Smith has said, "If the Army had to train three million men per year, manning the training base would magnify rather than decrease turbulence [i.e., turnover] in the operating units."⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Brigadier General Lynn D. Smith, "The Unsolved Problem," *Military Review*, June, 1964.

PART III

New Men for a New Military

Chapter 11

The Ethics of Abolition

It would be pleasant, having disposed of the undesirable alternatives of a lottery, national service and universal military training, to proceed with an explanation of how abolition of the draft and reestablishment of a volunteer military can now be achieved in America. But first one must deal with the regrettable fact that some military men and politicians actually oppose a volunteer system in principle, even if it is feasible in practice.

"No one likes a draft law," the late Representative Carl Vinson, long the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, once said. But he was wrong. General Hershey likes it. And among others, the Veterans of Foreign Wars like it, having resolved at their 1962 and 1966 conventions, that "Our nation should *never* be without an obligation for every youth to serve his country in a military capacity" (emphasis added).

An all-volunteer military, its opponents charge, would

have to increase the financial attractions of service, and thereby would fill the Armed Forces with "mercenaries." Of course, no one at all has suggested the creation of a volunteer military that would offer a man more money than he could receive in civilian life, let alone that would make him rich, but that does not deter the pious nonsense of the draft lobby. By their own standard, though they refuse to be defended by "mercenaries," they readily receive medical treatment, education,⁷⁹ legal advice, spiritual guidance and virtually everything else from "mercenaries"; from persons, that is, who make a living at their work.

Indeed, the politicians in the draft lobby themselves are "mercenaries." So is the career Director of the Selective Service System, General Hershey, who nonetheless is among the most vehement in insisting he would not want to be defended by one. (Presumably he would rather share a foxhole with one of his recently inducted draft-card burners.)

In fact, whether the draft lobbyists like it—or realize it—or not, they *are* defended by "mercenaries." The Pentagon is full of civilian "mercenaries" and all the brass of the Armed Forces, and indeed all the career officers and enlisted men who even today make up the bulk of our military manpower, are "mercenaries." Is their patriotism or competence to defend the nation being challenged? Is the draft lobby belittling the men who made up the entire Armed Forces of the United States for 160 of our 190-year history, not just the foot soldiers, but the heroes like Custer and Mitchell, the leaders like Grant, Pershing and MacArthur?

⁷⁹ Teachers generally are still not paid nearly enough, but at least society recognizes that they should be paid in *some relation* to their worth, which it has not recognized in regard to soldiers.

To disparage the concept of a volunteer military as a "mercenary" system just because all the men—and not just a few as at present—would receive a respectable living wage is a preposterous insult to the career fighting man, and also to the intelligence of the public which must listen to such contentions. Men should not be paid for their patriotism, but neither should they be punished for it.

No less foolish is the claim that a volunteer Armed Forces would be unfair to the poor and disadvantaged just for the reason that they would be attracted to it, and, as Congressman Charles S. Joelson of New Jersey, has put it, "sent off to be killed." Surely this is the most impoverished idea of the povertarians. If a man, whatever his race or class, decides that the military offers him a career superior to that he can obtain elsewhere, who can be so condescending as to suggest he is being bribed or bamboozled? Since most of the military is careerist now, it would appear that some of the poor and disadvantaged already are attracted to it. Are *they* being exploited?

Moreover, it is perhaps not condescending, but certainly inaccurate, to characterize the service of these poor presently in the military or any in the future as "being sent off to be killed," since even now—to repeat—only one-fifth of the men in the service are in combat positions and less than one-ninth of our total forces serve in Vietnam. As a matter of fact, the mortality rate for men in the service and that for their counterparts in civilian life is exactly the same, 2.5 deaths per 1000 men per year. Combat certainly raises the military's death-rate, but widespread medical treatment and initially healthier manpower than the civilian cross section keep it down (see table).

This certainly is not pointed out to depreciate the inestimable sacrifices of men who fight for the nation, or even

DEATHS PER 1000 MEN PER YEAR*

	In battle	All causes
Civilian young men	0	2.5
Military personnel †	1.1	2.5 (including battle)

* Cited by Edward F. Hall, Litchfield (Conn.) *Enquirer*, May 26, 1966.

† Based on April 1966 figures.

the contributions of military men in noncombat posts, but merely to put the situation in perspective.

For in perspective, given the values of a free society and, indeed, the history of the United States, a volunteer military is not merely the fairest system of recruitment, but the only fully fair system, and it is the American norm. "A nation in arms" was a Napoleonic idea and a Prussian idea; the principle of free men freely deciding on soldiery traditionally has been a value appreciated in Great Britain and the United States. A very large part of the mass immigration to our shores was comprised of Europeans surfeited by systems of compulsion, including the draft in particular, and our democracy has never been served by statist requisitions of unneeded manpower, but by giving each man his choice of opportunities.

Entirely voluntary armies fought several wars and protected us in between them. When a draft became plainly necessary, in the massive land conflicts of the Civil War, World War I and World War II, it was tolerated in the knowledge that it was an emergency measure, to be dismantled after the war like other emergency measures that temporarily gave the state unusual control of a man's person and liberty.

After World War II it also appeared necessary to ex-

tend the draft into peacetime for fear another large war could erupt at any time. Since then the situation has changed with the development of powerful and sophisticated weapons, the lessened likelihood of a massive land war and, most of all, the unprecedented, skyrocketing growth of military-age manpower. Still the draft lingers on, an anachronism fifteen years after it was institutionalized, an anachronism lacking even the blessing of tradition.

Today opponents of the draft include men of varied ideological views—left, right and center. An irrefragable conservative who served as an adviser to Senator Goldwater in the Presidential campaign of 1964, Professor Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago, does as well as anyone in describing the true nature of the draft.

"Conscription," he says, "is a tax in kind—that is, forced labor imposed on the young men who are drafted or who volunteer to serve because of the threat of the draft. One of the greatest advances in human freedom was the conversion of taxes in kind to money taxes. A similar advance would be attained now by repealing conscription and using volunteer enlistment to staff our armed forces."⁸⁰

The abolition of the draft and a new all-volunteer military can terminate the conundrum of contradictions and confusion, the mandarin complexities, discriminations, and inefficiencies of the so-called Universal Military Training and Service Act. The evasion mentality among the young can be curbed. Lives in a world already anxious and precarious can be freed of the draft's additional uncertainty. The insidious, subtle power of a vast bureaucracy

⁸⁰ Quoted by Jack Raymond, "The Draft Is Unfair," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 2, 1966.

to interfere in a citizen's personal plans—to punish, threaten, or “channel”—can be eliminated and personal freedom enhanced.

All this is now achievable because the draft is no longer necessary; it *can* be replaced, and therefore it should be replaced.

Chapter 12

A Voluntary Military

The river of American manpower is widening and deepening; the needs of the American military grow increasingly complex, and, meanwhile, its manpower recruitment policy—the draft—remains unchanged. Yet change it must and will, despite the obfuscation and delays of the draft lobby, for the new situation is making the draft less and less tenable.

The baby boom of the post-World War II era already has nearly doubled the number of men turning draft age, and their number will continue to rise. Military technology will continue to grow in sophistication, just as it has during all of modern history. Greater sophistication necessitates a higher percentage of specialized personnel, which in turn requires greater professionalization and longer terms of service. A draftee, inducted against his will, given minimal training and released in two years' time, cannot help meet the changing needs at all—for example, the need for more

electronics technicians than infantrymen, more mechanics than truck drivers.

It is remarkable that the Department of Defense has given the problem of manpower recruitment and utilization such a low priority. On separate occasions in 1965, Secretary McNamara, the man with the reputation for precision thinking, was asked to estimate the cost of replacing the draft with a volunteer system; his two answers were four billion dollars and twenty billion dollars.⁸¹ The official Pentagon figures, delineated in Chapter 7, have been different from McNamara's and no more consistent. Only the fear of the draft, they say, can provide the high-quality men the military needs, and, of course, under present conditions, that is true. But the Pentagon does not like to discuss those present conditions if it can help it—if fear is all the military offers, fear is all that will work. When the Pentagon does find it necessary to discuss the possible improvements of conditions toward recruiting an all-volunteer force, it examines them one at a time—"if such-and-such a reform were tried, could we achieve total professionalism?"—and decides that each proposed change is inadequate to conquer the problem. At no time whatever has the Pentagon (so far as anyone outside it knows) studied what would happen if all the reforms were implemented.

The very first obstacle to a voluntary system which the Department of Defense likes to position in front of reformers is the need in a normal year to replace the some 500,000 men—one-sixth of the total forces—who resign or retire each year. Currently, some 100,000 are obtained

⁸¹ Cited by the author and George F. Gilder in *The Party that Lost Its Head*, Knopf, New York, 1966. The two occasions were a February, 1965, Congressional budget hearing and a *This Week* magazine interview published in December, 1965.

ordinarily through the draft and most of the rest through the threat of the draft. To hire 500,000 men at pay competitive with the private sector, you see, the Pentagon sighs discouragingly, would of course be prohibitively expensive.

The question the Pentagon does not raise or answer in public, however, is why there is such a huge turnover of personnel in the first place. No large business could or would tolerate a loss of one-sixth of its employees each year, and only the eternal patience of the taxpayer permits that kind of operation in the military. The turnover rate constitutes one of the greatest hidden costs in the manpower policies of the entire nation.

According to Brigadier General Lynn D. Smith, 43 percent of the Army at any given time has less than one year's experience. Draftees are the most wasteful. Their reenlistment rate ranges from 3 to 10 percent; that is, the draftee turnover rate is 90 to 97 percent, almost a total manpower loss. Since the full cost of training a foot soldier is a minimum of \$6000,⁸² the price tag on draftee turnover alone begins at 600 million dollars annually.

For the bulk of the turnover—first-term enlisted men and officers—the rates are also startling, varying in the neighborhood of 25 percent, a turnover loss of 75 percent. For career men, however, the reenlistment rate hovers annually at some 85 percent, a mere 15 percent loss, and if that rate, which is not uncommon in such all-volunteer military systems as Canada's, could be maintained throughout the United States military, assuming an average enlistment of three years per man, the annual replacement needs could be cut to 150,000, as opposed to the

⁸² Congressional Legislative Research Service report, July 8, 1964.

500,000 men that have to be replaced now. Moreover, that is a conservative assumption since the reenlistment rates of those already professionals would go higher still were overall service conditions bettered.

"Ask a hundred commanders from four stars to one bar . . . 'What is the basic problem of the Army today?'," says General Smith, "and most will tell you, 'Too much personnel turbulence. By the time we are able to operate as a unit, the trained men leave and we have to start all over again,'" ⁸³ Consequently, for many units, the "Farewell Party" is literally an everyday occurrence.

Besides men leaving the services, other men must be shifted around to fill their places and new men trained in remarkably large numbers—some 140,000 at any given time, the equivalent of ten divisions.⁸⁴ This extravagance too is part of the draft's overhead. The services found a few years ago that some of their men were in training for as long as a year and a half of their two- or three-year stints. In most cases, the military's reaction has been to defer advanced training for both draftees and enlistees until they reenlist—if they do. Thus, in effect, many men are just being kept around to see if they indeed will "Re-up," with most of the meantime wasted. Of course, many second-termers who do get their training in some specialty merely postpone their departure that much longer, having no intention of becoming career men—and both of their terms then are wasted.

It is peculiar that one of the proudest claims made on behalf of the compulsory military is that it requires such

⁸³ Smith, *op. cit.*

⁸⁴ Before the Vietnam buildup; the figure would be greater now.

huge training programs that, as Hanson W. Baldwin of *The New York Times* has put it, "Annually scores of thousands of technicians doff their uniforms to form the backbone of trained labor staff in electronic, aerodynamic, automotive and other industries . . ." ⁸⁵

Surely that is a defeat and not a victory. The best educators and the best professional trainers are not in the military but in the private sector. A man is best prepared for a job in civilian life by training for that job, not by training for some vaguely similar job in the Armed Forces, where, under the present system, moreover, he often picks up the familiar military attitude that anything requiring the work of two men can be done in twice the time by four. Attitudes of inefficiency in fact pervade many military training programs. Men supposedly are picked for training according to ability, but actually are often recruited as bodies to fill vacant training slots. If the bakers' school which was oversubscribed last month is undersubscribed today, the Army very likely will pick the next certain number of draftees who come along to complete the class, even if they would prefer as individuals to do something different. Unwilling bakery students are not the best bakery students, of course, and unwilling bakers are neither the best bakers nor the ones most likely to stay with the military.

Ralph J. Cordiner, who headed an efficiency study of military operations for President Eisenhower in 1957, described the training camps: "I found antagonism and bitterness over the draft. They were checking off the days until they get out. We must devote 25 percent of our military effort to training men who don't stay. The trainers are

⁸⁵ Hanson W. Baldwin, *The New York Times*, September 27, 1964.

discouraged. They resemble the poor teacher whose every class flunks.”⁸⁶ In times of rapid buildup, as in 1965 and 1966, this situation is actually exacerbated, and at all times the dissatisfaction of draftees put into jobs they dislike threatens to infect the morale of enlistees who have taken such jobs by choice.

The military’s training programs also unquestionably prejudice the economy in favor of defense-associated civilian enterprises, since other industries have to operate more complete training programs of their own and because the draft makes manpower for such non-defense enterprises harder to acquire. And the military suffers most of all, for it must tie down large numbers of men to train others, and when all is said and done, surely would prefer a few experienced technicians to the present large, fast turnover. Without the draft, Secretary McNamara wrote to then Vice President Johnson in January, 1963, “maintenance of currently approved military strengths would not be practicable, and critical personnel shortages would develop.” Yet critical personnel shortages develop now because, as many military men hold, so much time and manpower must be used for training. In 1965, Secretary McNamara told a Senate subcommittee that to scrap the draft system “would make it very difficult, if not impossible, to guarantee that the necessary manpower would be available in time to meet the kinds of rapid changes in military requirements which we have encountered in recent years.”⁸⁷ Yet since many more men would be freed to meet any

⁸⁶ Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation (the “Cordiner Report”), “A Modern Concept of Compensation for Personnel of the Uniformed Services,” March, 1957.

⁸⁷ February 1966 Hearings, Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, p. 205.

emergency if the training program could be cut down, it is hard to see that the readiness of the military could be anything but enhanced. Since when are semitrained soldiers superior to well-trained ones, short-term conscripts better fighters than experienced professionals? The morale of professionals is axiomatically higher than that of conscripts, and certainly such things are factors in readiness. Indeed, such considerations must have loomed large in McNamara’s hesitancy to activate the least trained, shortest-term troops of all, the Reserves.

Draftees and one-term enlistees are inadequate manpower material for today’s new military. The “Cordiner Report,” prepared for President Eisenhower, clearly states the central manpower need:

Reduced to its simplest terms, the personnel problem appears to be a matter of quality as opposed to quantity. It is not a matter of the total number of people on hand, but it is a matter of the level of retention of those possessing a high degree of leadership quality and those with the technical training and experience the services so urgently need. It is a matter of not being able, at the present time and under the present circumstances, to keep and challenge and develop the kinds of people for the periods of time necessary for them to make an effective contribution to the operation of the force . . .

It is foolish for the armed forces to obtain highly advanced weapons systems and not have men of sufficient competence to understand, operate, and maintain such equipment . . . The solution here, of course, is not to draft more men to stand and look helplessly at the machinery. The solution is to give the men already in the armed forces the incentives required to make them want to stay in the service long enough and try hard enough to take these

higher responsibilities, gain the skill and experience levels we need and then remain to give the services the full benefit of their skills.

Thus, all the hidden costs of the draft add up, and to those mentioned so far one must add the cost to society as a whole of careers impeded, of abnormal demands on the educational system, and of rushed marriages and early parenthood.

It is smugly observed by draft defenders that when the draft was dismantled briefly in 1947 the military could not meet its required force levels. But all this demonstrates is that the manpower market then was far smaller than today's and that the Pentagon did not know much about positive manpower recruitment then either. It must have learned a bit in the subsequent decade, but the Cordiner Report does not suggest it, and neither does the complacency of the Department of Defense today.

The primary obstacle to the Government's rethinking this problem is the tacit assumption that military life simply cannot be made very attractive to very many persons. Certainly it is not very attractive now, but it is long past time for the military and the Congress to learn exactly why and to change the situation where possible. A survey by the Office of Armed Forces Information and Education in 1955 revealed that adult citizens tend to depreciate the worth of a career in the military because of what they consider inadequate financial remuneration, because of military discipline, because of the "lack of family life," and lastly, because of slow advancement. Some of the negative attitudes toward military life come from the memories of veterans, but most of the bad impressions reflect current conditions, which in some cases, are even worse.

Financially, the private entering the services today receives less in real terms than his predecessor in the period just after World War II. Despite 66 percent inflation since 1946,⁸⁸ the beginning monthly wage of a private has risen only slightly more than 20 percent, from \$75 in 1946 to \$90.60 today.⁸⁹ That is slightly more than the pay of a peasant on a collective farm in Rumania.⁹⁰ It is also less than the pay of a beginning army private in Germany, who starts at \$110 a month, or his counterpart in Canada who makes \$112 a month. In other words, an American soldier makes only 80 percent of the salary paid by two of our supposedly poorer NATO allies. The difference becomes even more striking when one considers that the average income in Germany is \$850 a year, in Canada, \$1550, while in the United States it is \$2250.⁹¹

Sometimes it is said that we should not feel too sorry for the American private, for his salary very quickly goes up. But actually, though it does go up in four months, it does not go very far and for two years—the draftee's normal term—a private's pay is still only \$96.90 a month, less than half what he could collect in unemployment compensation and little enough to qualify him as impoverished under the formulas of the War on Poverty. Over one-fourth of the Armed Forces—840,000 servicemen—are in this category.⁹² Indeed as Senator Gaylord Nelson, a staunch advocate of better treatment for the lower ranks of military men, told Congress in 1965, "as much as 40 per-

⁸⁸ Consumer Price Index, as adjusted 1946, 1966.

⁸⁹ Department of Defense, Public Affairs, August 18, 1966.

⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, April 7, 1965.

⁹¹ Senator Gaylord Nelson, *Congressional Record*, February 9, 1965.

⁹² *Ibid.* (Adjustments for housing and rations put most over the "poverty" level, but not far over.)

cent of the naval personnel stationed in the Washington area have outside jobs; 32 percent of the marines in the Washington area are also moonlighting.”⁹³

An Air Force report in 1964 revealed that 71,000 Air Force personnel—70,000 of them airmen—had off-duty jobs to supplement their income. The most significant discovery of all was that some 5000 Air Force personnel actually were on public relief. Many of these men were in the middle-pay grades, indicating an interest in career service, and were trying to raise families.⁹⁴ Many others, who might be tempted by service careers, obviously get out rather than try to take on familial obligations with only a service salary. The way the military deals with this problem is to show propaganda films to new recruits discouraging them from early marriage. What it considers “early” is shown by this memorandum from the Air Force read into the *Congressional Record* by Senator Nelson:

It must be noted that whatever poverty may exist for these people is primarily a result of their own decision. Existing law does not contemplate that an enlisted man of the first four pay grades with under four years of service will be married. To this end, no quarters allowance is provided for these people and they are not entitled to housing. Upon a permanent change of station, their dependents are not recognized and the sponsor is not entitled to travel allowance for his dependents or movements of his household goods.⁹⁵

It is no wonder, given such an attitude from the military—and the Government that oversees it—that most young men today are not attracted to the services as a ca-

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

reer. The pay scale is most out of line in the first two years of service, the ones a young man considers when deciding whether to join up. Despite three pay raises totaling a 20 percent increase in recent years for officers and higher grade enlisted men, only one raise of 3.2 percent has been given the junior grade enlisted men. Senator Nelson has proposed raising the starting pay of a private by the same percentage that other servicemen have received since World War II—bringing him up to a starting pay of \$117 a month—and also raising somewhat the pay of those men with more than two years’ service. Nelson says the total cost would be 690 million dollars.

One hundred and seventeen dollars a month is still a paltry sum, however, even with housing and other benefits—such as the privilege of using the base exchange, a store whose prices normally are no lower than those of a civilian discount house. To raise the pay of all 840,000 servicemen in the impoverished state described by Senator Nelson, an average of \$100 a month—to roughly double, that is, the pay of privates—would cost only slightly more than one billion dollars. Of course, an even larger raise might be needed, and the wages of nearly all men in the services should be lifted somewhat. The servicemen thus attracted would hardly be “mercenaries”; though they might have enough to allow them to be tempted by the other attractions of a military career.

An estimate by the Pentagon, leaked to Washington *Star* military correspondent Richard Fryklund at the time its study was originally supposed to be released (May, 1965), suggested that pay raises costing three billion dollars a year could supply the Armed Forces with sufficient volunteer manpower.⁹⁶ That figure, which clashes with

⁹⁶ Washington, D.C., *Star*, May 11, 1965.

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those of Secretary McNamara in 1965 and the Pentagon's presentation to the House Armed Services Committee in 1966, still seems high. But it is certainly more reasonable than the various scare figures offered later.

If three billion dollars in pay hikes will bring into the military sufficient volunteers to abolish the draft and thereby reduce the annual turnover of personnel to 150,000 (or lower) as previously described, the military would save the costs of training more than 350,000 men a year who otherwise would have had to be replaced. And if those savings were only the *minimum* cited earlier—\$6000 per man—they would amount to 2.1 billion dollars.

Reduction in turnover would also mean reduction in the total number of men needed. When training facilities were reduced, many men currently used as trainers could be switched to other posts. The Cordiner Report estimated that the number of transportation personnel in the Armed Forces could be cut and suggested that the greater concern of professional troops for the machinery they use and their greater knowledge of it could mean a 10-percent reduction in maintenance technicians. With these savings added onto the initial savings from reduced training, the Cordiner Report estimated the Government would save 2.8 billion dollars in the third year after adoption and five billion dollars in the fifth year. That would be far more than enough, in other words, to cover the cost of increased wages.

But higher pay is just the first and major way of providing incentives for volunteers. It should be adequate to maintain the military at ordinary (pre-Vietnam buildup) force levels. But to guarantee the flexibility for expansion that Secretary McNamara feels is necessary and to give the military some wider choice among enlistees, the military as a way of life can be made more attractive for men and

women at all levels, beyond simple remuneration. We must start by a more thorough examination of the full range of motivations for a man's entering the Armed Forces: such psychic rewards as the military's aura of manliness and vigor, the promise of travel and adventure, loyalty to country, a sense of belonging that comes with pride in one particular unit and its traditions, the knowledge that the country respects and appreciates one's service; and the more mundane incentives of career rewards such as job training and security, a pension and fringe benefits and the general community attractions of the military life.

The psychic rewards, of course, are largely undercut by the draft. A serviceman's pride cannot help but suffer when other men are conscripted to do the work he does by choice. A volunteer military would enhance the psychic rewards automatically. The image of military life—the way the public sees the soldier and the soldier sees himself—can be improved as well by attention to such psychologically potent matters as uniforms. Many armies of the past made sure that the crack combat troops were endowed with especially glamorous dress uniforms to give them a special sense of pride and satisfaction in public, and the prestige of the "green beret"—granted the Special Forces by President Kennedy's intervention over the policies of the Pentagon—attest to the continuing effect of such symbolic appurtenances.

But the best way to improve the image of military life, obviously, is to improve the more basic conditions of the life. At present, we are still afflicted with an attitude of austerity toward the physical and social situation in which one-termers and careerists alike must live. We apparently think it is good for the military soul to exist in an environment of total Spartan functionalism. Our military posts,

though sometimes for good reason, are often situated in out-of-the-way spots with little life beyond the base gates, and with social life inside so painfully plain and so confining that many enlisted men in particular live in constant anticipation of their next brief pass into town, where, not surprisingly, the pressures of time and opportunity for recreation are too intense to lead to constructive outlets.

Housing for military men is seldom more than physically adequate and even for officers is usually aesthetically barren. Real community planning is more primitive on most military bases than in some of the grimmest subdivisions of the 1950's. Few professional men or skilled artisans would seriously consider taking their families to live in some square brick house in a neighborhood with hundreds of other, identical houses, in the midst of a tidy but sterile community with no civic center, where entertainment is found in a clapboard moviehouse or in a cement block officers' or "noncom" club. But that is what we expect our career military people to accept happily. Many do because there are other community compensations to military life, such as ample and inexpensive food and complete medical care, and there is also an occasional, exceptional military base that is actually attractive. But generally the environmental conditions under which career people live can and must be improved, for such conditions weigh heavily, whether consciously or not, in every man's career decisions. Unless we are to institute a totalitarian draft that takes a man at an early age and keeps him until retirement, we simply cannot get the highest quality of personnel in specialized positions for the long term without the promise of total social surroundings competitive with others available through civilian work.

All of the suggested reforms so far mentioned would

make the military more attractive to volunteers. But still further manpower savings can be achieved conversely by increasing the number of volunteers attractive to the military; i.e., by utilizing kinds of manpower presently either not accepted or not sought by the services. Reorganizing our standards for induction, for example, would widen enormously the flow of available manpower.

If the standards on the Armed Forces physical and mental tests can be kept unrealistically high to contract the manpower pool under the present draft, they can be used in a voluntary system to expand it. American men are no less fit than those of European countries, yet we are far more fussy about whom we will take into the military. The rejection rate in the United States has dropped during 1966 from 50 to 39 percent, but it still compares with rejection rates of 5 percent in Greece, 18 percent in Italy, 24 percent in The Netherlands, 18 percent in France, 8 percent in Belgium, 25 percent in Norway and 14 percent in Denmark.⁹⁷ Certainly the standards should be lowered in the United States, perhaps to the 10th percentile the Selective Service Act prescribes for wartime. This should be done in any time like the present when we are in a war whether or not the war is "declared." And it should be that low during peacetime as well, for the military is quite competent to provide the necessary instruction or treatment needed to correct the shortcomings of most rejectees before they enter regular training.

Indeed the Army and the Selective Service System have recommended such a program for mental test failures. General Hershey sees the program as part of his "uplift"

⁹⁷ Hearings, Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, "Nation's Manpower Revolution," November 12, 1963.

plan for all draftees, but under a volunteer system it could be used for those men who want to enlist but are rejected. The pilot project, called STEP, which the Army proposed to Congress, would have relied in fact on volunteers. STEP was approved by the House of Representatives but was defeated by the Senate, which felt the military should not get into remedial education schemes. But since the intent under a volunteer military system would be strictly to permit enlistees to qualify for the service, the Senate should take another look on those grounds. At present a fully developed project of the nature of STEP could provide an additional 100,000 men a year to the Armed Forces.⁹⁸

The constant constriction of the draft pool by means of high physical rejection rates has also resulted in inadequate attention to the possibilities of using manpower that in no case can pass the present examinations, even after remedial treatment. Men who are "too tall" for example, could still be used by a system in need of their talents. And men who could not be combat troops could be used in some of the military's jobs that are noncombat—80 percent of the total. No private company would have minimal physical and mental standards for all its employees. Basic job requirements vary in an airline company, for example, from the pilot to the reservations people to the mechanics to the baggage porters. Yet the Armed Forces require everyone to be a potential foot soldier for the simple reason that the basic training is still monolithically combat-

⁹⁸ An estimate. In the low-draft year of 1964, 70,000 volunteers were rejected; under a volunteer system, more men, of course, would volunteer, and hence there would be more volunteer rejectees—probably considerably more than 100,000. Even without Congressional approval some 40,000 draft rejectees are being rehabilitated now, but only over a year's time.

oriented. Perhaps, like the Russian army that defended Stalingrad, the cooks and typists of the United States military will someday have to defend the nation with a rifle (if so, for many it will be with rifles they have hardly ever used!), but it is unlikely and therefore nonsense to insist on combat potentiality from every recruit. As Senator Nelson has asked, "Does a clerk in a Washington procurement agency need the same physical abilities as a front line rifleman? Does a cook need the same civilian education . . . as a radar technician? Should a radio repairman be barred from service if he is not quite tall enough or is overweight or underweight?"⁹⁹

There already is a wide range in the physical demands made upon recruits at different service boot camps, with only two lessons in rifle practice for Air Force reservists, for example. There is no reason why an even wider range could not be devised so as to accommodate men whose physical condition is inappropriate to combat-style training.

Another way to expand available manpower is to hire civilian replacements for certain noncombat positions such as clerking, typing and maintenance. In 1965, Secretary McNamara showed some confidence in this policy by replacing 75,000 members of the Armed Forces in noncombat jobs with 60,000 civilians. That many other similar savings could be effected was implied at the end of 1965 in a little-noticed report of the Comptroller General's Office, which complained that some 9000 personnel it knew about were being used for wholly improper duty at such places as officers' clubs, bowling alleys and golf courses.

⁹⁹ Senator Gaylord Nelson, *Congressional Record*, June 29, 1964.

The total cost to the Government to keep one soldier for a year, says Representative Tom Curtis, is \$18,000, and civilian caddies come cheaper than that.

Curtis also suggests that the Armed Forces could recruit more civilians who already have needed specialized talents, the way the Seabees did in World War II. The added pay required to attract and hold men with expensive skills would be met by savings from the reduction of specialized training facilities. These are the kind of men whom the draft can never get and whom the present system, by keeping all service salaries down, makes it embarrassing for the military to tempt into the work by financial incentives.

It is a question whether the military even knows today what jobs it needs filled. It recruits a man with little regard for his special skills, often not using his civilian training after enlistment, though shortages may occur later in those very skills. During World War II, a Manpower Commission was used to coordinate manpower policies for the civilian and military sectors. No such commission now exists, although needs and skills become ever more varied and complex. Under a professional system the military would be required to keep the same kind of close check on the specialties of manpower needs and resources that any large company does in the civilian sphere. A new manpower commission is certainly in order.

As is, the Armed Forces spend some fifty million dollars annually on recruitment and cannot acquire the volunteers to operate our military. A restructuring of manpower utilization policies and basic improvements in both the substance and image of military life can secure those volunteers.

Some assert that while such improvements might pro-

vide the military manpower for most specialized positions, a volunteer system without the draft, and even with major career improvements, could not attract the all-around generalist needed as officer material. But this is a false distinction and a groundless worry. Even now Congress is swamped each year with more than twice as many qualified candidates for the military service academies as can be accepted.¹⁰⁰ The academies suffer less from the stigma that the compulsion of the draft and inadequate compensation have affixed to the military at large, and the academies' success at instilling professional pride is manifested in its graduates' record of 85 percent reenlistment, compared with less than a 30 percent reenlistment rate among college Reserve Officer Training Corps (R.O.T.C.) and Officer Candidate School (O.C.S.) graduates.

Clearly, the academies should be expanded. It would also help to remove them from the Congressional appointment system, which was established to make sure that each district of the country got a fair share of appointments. But many districts have a number of qualified candidates who apply through their Congressmen, while others have few or none. Their selection is usually a burden rather than welcome patronage for the Congressmen and is often turned over to secretaries who know little of the military. Under a volunteer system, with enlarged academies or new branches of them, there would be room for all truly qualified applicants and there would be no need for concern over geographical representation. Similarly, under the volunteer system the number of all-expense R.O.T.C. college scholarships should be vastly increased to offer further incentives for officer-quality volunteers. In training the R.O.T.C. students, moreover, the military should reassess

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

its habit of appointing to instructor positions a high proportion of officers who have been passed over for promotion and are given the soft R.O.T.C. duty on college campuses as their terminal assignments. Understandably, such men are often secretly soured on the military and do not make its most enthusiastic proponents. It would be better if the services hired some of their younger retired officers who would bring considerable dedication to their jobs and inspire the same in their students.

The effect of all these programs will be to redirect radically the manpower attitudes of the military into healthier channels and to save the Government money in the long run. If the Armed Forces eagerly seek out qualified men in the way other businesses and governmental institutions do, we can find them in ample numbers to end the uneconomical and unfair draft.

Chapter 13

A Transitional Draft

Congressman Curtis pictures the draft as a crutch for antiquated manpower and recruitment policies. That crutch, however, cannot be removed overnight. Once the Government has decided to adopt the principle of an all-volunteer, professional military, new policies relating to manpower procurement and utilization, and the wide sweep of career incentives, must be carefully developed and implemented. The full consequence of the new programs might not be manifested for three to five years.

In the meantime a transitional draft, reformed and re-directed, must operate to assure everyone of the nation's primary determination to maintain the full strength of the Armed Forces. Emerson once wrote, "If you cannot be free, be as free as you can," which might well be the principle behind the transitional draft. We can learn from all the failures of the system as it operates now and we know

enough of the dangers of totally different systems not to experiment with them.

Even a transitional draft will, of course, require some debate and legislation by the Congress, but it might well include these new features:

The average age of the draftee would be lowered and wider eligibility within the draft pool achieved. All men would register at age 18, as they do now; they also would be examined then, and the same deferments would be available except for students. However, at age 18 few men are likely to be deferred for any of the common reasons that apply later, such as a critical occupation or fatherhood. The same lowered standards of acceptability suggested previously for volunteers and the same remedial training program would obtain under the temporary, transitional draft, and men not fit for combat training would undergo a different process and be used in noncombat posts. The rejection rate at 18 would likely be lower in any case, since the men would have had less time to suffer debilitating illnesses and accidents.

All actual draft selection would take place between the ages of 18½ and 20½, the time in a man's life when the interruption would cause the least personal inconvenience and the age before he has acquired set ways, when the military would rather train him. College students who were drafted would be given the option of serving at once or of obligating themselves to serve immediately after graduation. Serving at once would make available the economic educational assistance offered under the new G.I. bill of rights, and service upon completion of college would offer the prospect of uninterrupted college and the possibility of obtaining an officer's commission at its conclusion.

In short, the 1-A pool of the transitional draft would

be much deeper but narrower than today's, affecting a larger percentage of a smaller age group, thereby ending some of the grosser inequities operating in the present system. The reformed system also would remove the Damocles sword of anxious uncertainty now hanging over men for eight years between age 18 and 26—a period General Hershey would like to extend. At 20½ a man would be free of any concern about the draft, and with the end of that concern would come still other benefits; an end to the evasion mentality now caused by the draft, an end to discrimination from employers, and an end to the draft's odious "channeling."

It may be protested that the termination of men's effective obligation at age 20½ instead of 26 will dangerously shrink the manpower pool, but actually the two-year 1-A pool would be quite adequate thanks to the lowered incidence of deferments, lower acceptability standards on entrance examinations and—to stress it once again—the continuing population growth among the younger age groups. The current 18½-to-20½ manpower pool, for instance, if utilized under the transitional system here proposed, would total 3,200,000, roughly half of whom would be needed to maintain current military force levels even if no more men were to volunteer than do at present; that is, the same proportion as now ever serve out of the larger 18-to-26 pool.

The transitional system with the reduction and lowering of the years of effective draft vulnerability would be fairer than any other, including especially the current draft. The Selective Service System has resisted any reduction or lowering of the draft obligation age because it fully desired the longer period of strain and anxiety as a stick to goad men into enlisting outside the draft. Under the transi-

tional system, with the onset of new attractions to military service, that unpleasant goad no longer would be necessary.

But some would still be forced to serve in the military while others would not. Indeed, that is one reason why, though it is superior to the current system, a lottery, U.M.T. or national service, the reformed draft that is proposed here should only be transitional, and during the transition its inequities ameliorated by kinder, more efficient treatment of draftees.

It is a very grave injustice to force one man into involuntary service and allow another to go free. We will be on our way to expunging this injustice merely by establishing the goal of an all-volunteer military, but while that goal is being achieved we must admit to ourselves that the "necessity" we cite as our reason for conscripting men in the meantime springs directly from past failures to anticipate the new situation.

Even with the added pay that will be his as the volunteer-incentive program gets underway (and that should be the first step of the new policy), the draftee-private should be accorded some compensation at the end of his service for the fact that he was forced into uniform. Though we have rewarded veterans generally in the past with a variety of substantial benefits, we have never accorded special benefits to the draftee. This was partly because the real near-universality of service in the two World Wars and Korea made the draftee's sacrifice of freedom and relative earning power less notable. Moreover, the country did not have the money to provide special compensation to the draftee. Now however, the plight of the coerced draftee—the only citizen in our society other than the convicted criminal who is impressed into personally unprofitable ac-

tivity—is more acute for its being less common, and the country, whose coffers are expected to swell with 50 billion dollars of new Federal revenues by 1975,¹⁰¹ can easily afford some financial indemnification for the unhappy man whose life it must literally borrow for two years.

Therefore, just as the benefit of the draftee's coerced service is enjoyed by society as a whole, payment of some form of compensation to the draftee at the end of his duty should be borne by all in the form of taxes. The easiest way to compensate the former draftee—and a modest compensation it would be—might be found in a grant of an additional \$600 income tax deduction (not a credit) for ten years after service. Such a grant would be of some help to a man in competing in his desired field with peers who were not required to serve. Some may say that serving through the draft is legally a "privilege" as well as an obligation and should not be rewarded. In fact, it is not a "privilege," whatever the law says, since a man is forced into it. But if it will placate the legalists, let the tax deduction granted the former draftee be considered legally a tax paid for his benefit—also as a "privilege"—by the rest of society.

The draft under the transitional system also would be reformed in its internal workings to remove some of the inequities which result from neglect and inefficiency, variously applied standards, and too much decentralization of operations.

To make all young men as well-informed as possible about the draft, the Selective Service System should encourage each high school in the country to include in its counseling program an explanation of the draft for all male students, if possible to be given before the last year of

¹⁰¹ Ripon Society paper, May, 1965.

obligatory school attendance. In any case, at age 18 each registrant with the Selective Service should receive a comprehensive guide to the draft and military service, first outlining simply his essential rights, obligations and choices, and secondly, detailing them.

Much of the injustice in the present system, which stems from inconsistent deferment policies, would be removed by drafting at age 18½. Tighter national guidelines for granting deferments would preclude many other inequities, as would centralized control of the national pool. Local boards would still register and classify, but power would be vested in national headquarters to call each man. Thus the same priorities could be observed everywhere in the country, with a 1-A man, aged 19, as likely to be called in a small town as a big city, in Texas as in Michigan. It would not help or hinder a man's likelihood of being inducted whether the physical and mental rejection rates were low or high in his area, whether many or few men from his area already were serving in the military or had volunteered for the draft, or whether his local board was efficient or inefficient in processing classifications and induction papers.

General Hershey has said data-processing organizations have told him that computers to speed the handling of paperwork would not be helpful so long as the Selective Service operates its decentralized system. However, with much of the actual processing of induction passed on to the national office, considerable advantage could be had from installation of computers, and such facilities could help reduce present and future paper "pipeline" jams. They also could store and maintain files on all the registrants with the draft, not just those in the 18½-to-20½

group, for such work should continue even after the all-volunteer military is in full operation.¹⁰²

Someday the draft might have to be called upon again, with millions of Americans put into uniform to fight a massive land-war somewhere in the world. Hopefully, that is not likely, but by maintaining the files of the Selective Service, and requiring all young men, even under the volunteer military system, to be tested at age 18 and keeping their records current, the draft machinery could respond just as rapidly as it can now, should any situation requiring mass mobilization arise.

But it must be reemphasized that any actual draft that drafts is no longer desirable or needed in the long run. The reformed draft system advocated here is superior to the present one or to the others prominently proposed, but its highest virtue is its transitional nature, designed to effect the rapid dismantling of the system itself.

¹⁰² Computers in such a situation might err as often as they appear to have in handling the College Qualification Test. However, unlike test results, classification errors would be quickly known both to local boards and to the concerned registrant, and either one could correct them.

Chapter 14

The Best Defense—Beyond the Draft

The first and largest practical problem awaiting draft reformers is that until recently the present system's weaknesses have been virtually accepted without thought or comment. Some people, usually those with romantic notions of what the draftee's life really accomplishes for himself or his country, think the draft is a social boon. If there were no draft today its proponents would have a hard time indeed convincing the nation of its necessity, but as is, advocates of abolition are the ones on the defensive, asked repeatedly to show that the draft is *not* necessary. Such demonstration has been especially difficult in light of the draft lobby's control of draft investigations and because ultimately the feasibility of abolition comes down to the question: Are we willing to establish the goal of an all-volunteer military and achieve it?

The present atmosphere of official complacency, requiring that draft critics prove their case, is distinctly anti-

libertarian; it is the necessity of the draft, not the possibility of doing away with it, that should be under constant question. Those who would retain coercive conscription in a democracy are the ones who should be required to bear the burden of proof. They have not so far.

Draft abolitionists have a special reason for asserting their case in light of the military's frequently stated preference for professional troops. General Smith, for example, has urged greater boldness in devising a better manpower system. "We need," he says, "a professional Army to man the outposts, and to be prepared to put out brush fires before they can escalate to thermonuclear holocausts. An Army composed of officers and men who stay in their units for years, not months. An Army composed of units which will be sent where the need exists and will stay until the need no longer exists, or until they are relieved by other units—not by the rotation of individuals. An Army composed of officers and men who, for a period of their adult lives, make a profession of the service, rather than an Army composed of civilians in uniform."¹⁰³

A volunteer military is in the best interests, then, of national defense as well as of individual liberty. For several hundred years a successful Pax Romana was maintained throughout the known world by the professional legions of Rome. Britain in her period of greatest world influence did not resort to conscription.

Still, against all the military preference for professionalism, the Department of Defense and the Administration choose to defend the draft. The reason, very simply, is the military's by now unreasoning fear that if the draft were abolished, Congress would not take the needed steps to guarantee an adequate volunteer force. Just as General

¹⁰³ Smith, *op. cit.*

Hershey fears that one reform in the draft's operation will lead to another, the Pentagon, which has frequent unpleasant misunderstandings with Congress, worries that politicians would fail to support the Defense Department in the manner to which it is accustomed should the draft be ended. Indeed, that happened when the draft was ended in 1947-48, and some claim it has happened in Britain since that nation ended its postwar draft a few years ago.¹⁰⁴

But the draft lobbyists within the Pentagon leadership are as irrational on this point as they imagine Congress to be. Our population and our national wealth are stupendously greater than they were in 1948 or than are those of Britain today. Hopefully, we're also capable of more intelligent manpower policies. The Pentagon knows very well that a professional military would constitute our best defense. If a majority of opinion-makers within the Pentagon are in favor of the draft on political grounds, that is because they don't understand politics. If they are not convinced, they will just have to be shown.

Certain State Department and other foreign policy officials should be similarly disabused. Some now feel, as Hanson W. Baldwin put it in *The New York Times*,¹⁰⁵ that elimination of the draft "would have international political and psychological effects, some of them adverse to the image . . . of a strong and determined America. In other words, democracy, as usual, must be prepared to give up some of its internal freedom if necessary to protect itself against external enemies."

The answer clearly is that America's reputation for strength had better rest on more than the existence of a

¹⁰⁴ Even that claim has become highly dubious in light of Britain's reported intention of cutting back on some of her hired troops. Cf. *The New York Times*, October 9, 1966.

¹⁰⁵ Baldwin, *op. cit.*

draft. Indeed, if the United States could abolish the draft and obtain the benefit of military all-professionalism—surely the nation's image would be enhanced. If draft abolition were interpreted as a peaceful gesture, even as our real strength were increased, why should we hesitate?

In any event, the "giving up of . . . internal freedoms" is not properly justifiable on the basis of international *appearances*, an insubstantial, fickle commodity we should have learned to suspect by now.

And for how long does a democracy have to "give up some of its internal freedoms" for the sake of international prestige? What kind of "Great Society" is it that asks a portion of its citizens' liberties for elusive benefits in world public relations? These are not light matters, and draft reformers have a right to proceed to question the conduct and success of the full military manpower policy of the present government, as it relates to manpower not only as it is the business of the Department of Defense, but also in the Department of State.

Why, for example, do we insist repeatedly that we are not going to become "the world's policeman" when our policies encourage that trend? Secretary McNamara said in his Montreal speech in May, 1966, "The American people are not going to shirk their obligations in any part of the world, but they clearly cannot be expected to bear a disproportionate share of the common burden indefinitely." Certainly the Secretary is right, but do Americans generally realize how disproportionate that share really is? Mr. McNamara gave some indication when he said that "America has devoted a higher proportion of its gross national product to its military establishment than any other major free-world nation . . . even before our increased expenditures in Southeast Asia." That might well be un-

derstandable, even satisfactory, if we did not also bear the greatest proportionate manpower load. Said McNamara, "We have had, over the last few years, as many men in uniform as all the nations of Western Europe combined—even though they have a population half again greater than our own."

There is no reason the American public should accept such a situation with patient equanimity. Our Congress is far too concerned that we give only our fair share of foreign aid, and yet is hardly bothered at all about the inordinate sacrifice of manpower. In Germany, for example, America stations 210,000 troops, troops not usable elsewhere, troops not compensated for in German troops made available outside Europe, troops numbering twice the normal draftees called up each year in the United States. Yet while General Hershey is dissatisfied that we have only one-half of our men going into uniform in America, the Germans reject a far higher proportion of draftable men and those men drafted serve only one and a half years.¹⁰⁶

The conclusion is inescapable: either we have not tried to get our allies to help bear the cost in manpower, or we have been terrible failures. The same is true in our own hemisphere and it has been true in Southeast Asia. It was several years after the United States came to the aid of South Vietnam in her guerrilla war with the Vietcong before diplomatic pressure was exerted on that nation's neighbors in Asia to make any substantial contribution to it, even though those nations have more to lose by a Communist victory in that area than we do. Even now only South Korea has really strained to help the South Viet-

¹⁰⁶ M. R. D. Foot, *Men in Uniform*, Praeger, New York, 1961, p. 108.

namese cause; the Australian contribution of troops is still less than one-fourth the *per capita* American contribution.

One would not want to belittle the role of the Germans in Europe or the Australians in Vietnam, or those of any other nation. What is proper is to question what the United States is doing to become merely one part of the world police force instead of almost all of it. Granted that other countries have popular political minorities whose opposition to any overseas wars makes contributions of troops difficult. But we also have such a minority and it is one which has grown in just proportion to our increased involvement. While we cannot do more to sway public opinion abroad, we can offer other nations the sense of dignity and appreciated importance that comes with a shared command. The United States would not be eager to supply many troops to serve under Australian or Philippine command somewhere, and we cannot be surprised at other nations not wishing to have us in total control when their troops are involved.

Our flexible but general guide when small wars break out with possibilities for long duration should be to avoid fighting alone, to maximize from the beginning the active support of allies in the stricken nation's neighborhood. The political problems may be difficult, but the political alternatives are even more unpleasant to contemplate. For if the United States continues to fight virtually alone in the not unlikely small wars after Vietnam, the results will be damage to our international position, propaganda for world communism and waning domestic support for such protracted engagements, however necessary they may be.

Draft reformers also have a right to ask large questions regarding the efficient use of men within the American military. Despite the fact that we have the most technically


advanced armed forces in the world, we still must maintain almost as many servicemen as does the Soviet Union and actually 400,000 more troops than the almost totally infantry-oriented forces of Red China. Nor is this fully explained by our essentially defensive posture, requiring a capacity to respond to an enemy that supposedly can choose the most propitious time and place for his aggressions; or by the need of the United States to deploy manpower around the world as an earnest of our military commitments and as trigger elements for nuclear deterrent forces which we are unwilling, because of arms control objectives, to distribute to allies. President Kennedy promised with his election in 1960 to develop a military capable of flexibility and he added nearly 300,000 troops after his election so that we might quickly adjust to the needs of "brush-fire wars." Yet we had to more than double our draft when our commitment in Vietnam rose to more than 45,000 (out of the 2.7-million-man United States Armed Forces). To get 300,000 men into Vietnam—at the same time the Comptroller-General was reporting continued inefficient and inappropriate use of military personnel here at home—we had to increase the Armed Forces by another 400,000, mostly through the wasteful means of the draft, to 3.1 million. The expansion still goes on, and it is said that the demands on our manpower must have been severe to make this increase necessary. But at least partly behind that strain lies inefficient use of personnel evidenced, among other places, in the 500,000-man-a-year turnover.

When the war is ended, whether this year or five years from now, and the size of the Armed Forces is cut back, once again the military is going to experience wrenching manpower dislocations. As draftees and one-term enlistees

pour out of the services, the "personnel turbulence" complained of by General Smith in 1964 will increase monumentally. So will turbulence in the civilian sector as hundreds of thousands of additional men are returned to the economy. Part of the cost of these dislocations will be borne by the returning draftee or enlistee—to add to the others he has paid. Another part will be borne by society in inflationary pressures, undue employment fluctuations and strain on the educational system. All these costs are largely unnecessary.

The draft then is just one aspect of civilian and military manpower policies. But, of course, it is also the focus of controversy today. When the President's latest commission makes its report, scheduled for January, 1967, undoubtedly offering few sweeping changes and many minor ones, Congress will have the opportunity to open a real study of the subject. By summer, indeed, Congress will have to vote to extend or not extend the present outmoded Universal Military Training Act. It will be asserted once more by the draft lobby that a four-year extension will give plenty of time to do proper research and that to do less will jeopardize the republic. But perhaps draft reformers will be prepared with a simple suggestion: implement a reformed, transitional draft now, and while it operates, set about the business of building a volunteer, professional military.

The choice for Americans is not "internal freedoms" or the draft, for the draft corrodes not only our liberty but the quality of our military force. Our alternative is to improve the quality of both, that America might more purposefully pursue her dual mission in the world: to defend freedom and to exemplify it.



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
How Often Does Our Military Put the Wrong Man in Uniform?

"In this comprehensive book, Mr. Chapman combines an intimate knowledge of American political life with a thorough background in the subject matter—gained as a reporter and as an editorial writer for the *New York Herald Tribune*. His study covers the most recent material available on the draft, including the "report on the report" issued by the Department of Defense on June 30, 1966, and the record of the 1966 House Armed Services Committee hearings on the Selective Service System. In his analysis, Mr. Chapman brings to light some of the significant inequities that have developed in the draft due to the rapid increase in population and the changing technological needs of the military. His proposals for a volunteer, career military force in place of the draft are not new, but the wealth of statistics and objective presentation of the subject make this book a valuable contribution for the public's and the Congress' consideration of this important national issue... the publication of this knowledgeable and readable book must be welcomed by those of us in the Congress who have striven—so far in vain—to bring the draft and its problems to the forefront of public attention. This book could well arouse the public and provide the force which gets the Congressional machinery moving."

—INTRODUCTION, Rep. Thomas B. Curtis
(R-Missouri)

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BRUCE K. CHAPMAN is an Illinois-born writer. He was graduated with honors from Harvard College in 1962 and until 1964 was publisher of *Advance* magazine, a journal of political thought. He later became an editorial writer for the *New York Herald Tribune* and co-authored, with George F. Gilder, *The Party That Lost Its Head* (Knopf, 1966). Mr. Chapman's writing has appeared in leading magazines and newspapers and he is often a speaker on topics relating to the American political scene. • A seasoned traveler, Mr. Chapman has visited every American state but Alaska. His overseas journeys have taken him to Vietnam, the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and more than a score of other nations. • Mr. Chapman, now a resident of Seattle, is at work on two new books—a critical work about a major political personality and a novel.



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